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THE WTO’S GEMEINSCHAFT
Sungjoon Cho∗
“[Human beings] are endowed with reason
and conscience and should act towards one
another in a spirit of brotherhood.”∗∗
“[P]overty anywhere constitutes a danger to
prosperity everywhere.”∗∗∗
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I.

INTRODUCTION: INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND ITS DISCONTENTS

The initially ambitious march by members of the World Trade Organization (WTO),1 clad with pompous commitments, to Cancún, Mexico in
September 2003 for the fifth WTO Ministerial Conference quickly degraded
into frustration and disappointment.2 Betraying hopes across the globe that
it would usher in a new era of development and thus send a positive signal
to the global village, the Cancún Conference failed to address rampant protectionism by the rich countries in the sectors of agriculture and textiles, on
which many poor countries depend for their subsistence. Poor countries did
not demand “special favors,” but merely that the rich “play[ ] by the rules,”
which the rich coldly refused.3 As one African cotton farmer reportedly
bemoaned, even the WTO is now against the poor, in addition to hardship,
famine, and disease.4 While the collapse certainly precipitated skepticism
about the WTO’s effectiveness, it also revealed problems inherent in the
current system’s deep structural limitations.
Despite a half-century’s institutional evolution, the WTO’s ontology
largely remains an agora for trade “negotiation” in which reciprocal bar1.
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND; 33 I.L.M. 1140 (1994)
[hereinafter RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND]; Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 33 I.L.M. 1140 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
2.
See generally Sungjoon Cho, A Bridge Too Far: The Fall of the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancún and the Future of Trade Constitution, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 219 (2004) [hereinafter Cho, A
Bridge Too Far].
3.
WTO, Summary of 10 September, 2003, Day 1: Conference Kicks Off with “Facilitators”
Named and Cotton Debated, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/min03_10sept_e.ht
m (last visited Feb. 14, 2004).
4.
BRIDGES DAILY UPDATE ON THE FIFTH WTO MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE, At the Eleventh Hour,
Divergence All Over Again, Issue 5, Sept. 14, 2003, http://www.ictsd.org/ministerial/cancun/wto_daily/b
en030914.htm.
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gains take place among members, and members share only their affluence
and not their hardships. Negotiation is, in itself, an inferior form of discourse in that its dialectical pressure tends to eliminate, not accommodate,
voices of the less powerful. Negotiation reflects and reinforces power disparities among participants.5 The power sensitive negotiation structure, in
turn, even in the presence of official yet vague rules, tends to shape international commerce in a mercantilist, or sometimes exploitive, fashion. Therefore, in this global “Gesellschaft”—metaphorized as a “metropolis” pulling
everything and everyone toward the global center via materialistic gravity6—the poor and powerless are vulnerable to being ill-treated and marginalized. Their sufferings, although sympathized with intermittently, are structurally and inherently off the radar of the rich and powerful and thus inaccessible to the latter’s socio-political equations that control resources and
determine policy change. All told, “global empathy” does not exist in the
current global trading system, and hence there is no true community.
As a result of this condition, we often experience the perplexing and
unpleasant phenomenon in which parochial, narrow-minded commercial
interests in the rich countries block economic development in the poorest
countries. For example, African cotton is driven out of the global market by
highly-subsidized cotton production in the United States.7 Similarly, the
European Union (EU), under its Common Agricultural Policy, bans the importation of fruit and vegetables. These are the only types of products a
small country like Moldova has to compete with, while lavishly subsidized
like-products undersell Moldovan products even in the Russian market.8 To
these Africans and Moldovans, the current global trading system, symbolized by the WTO, is neither beneficial nor fair and legitimate. The ghost of
Karl Marx still haunts us.9
Admittedly, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT
1947),10 which was part of the post-war international economic architec5.
See Jeff Ward, Jürgen Habermas, at http://thispublicaddress.com/catalogue/Habermas.html (last
visited Feb. 14, 2004). Ward criticizes the Platonic notion of dialogue emphasizing its outcome (persuasion), which tends to silence the voices of the persuaded (the powerless). He finds a more desirable
construction in the Habermasian version, which regards dialogue as a process, rather than a result, and
thus accommodates dissenting or minority views.
6.
FERDINAND TÖNNIES, COMMUNITY AND SOCIETY 223-31 (GEMEINSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT)
(Charles P. Loomis trans. & ed., 1957), reprinted in MARCELLO TRUZZI, SOCIOLOGY: THE CLASSIC
STATEMENTS 145-54 (1971) [hereinafter THE CLASSIC STATEMENTS], available at http://www2.pfeiffer.
edu/~lridener/courses/GEMEIN.HTML (last visited Feb. 17, 2004).
7.
See Stitched Up, ECONOMIST, July 26, 2003, at 71. Cf. Jagdish Bhagwati, Don’t Cry for Cancún,
83 FOREIGN AFF. 52, 61 (2004) (submitting that the U.S. should have conceded on the issue of reducing
of cotton subsidies). Recently, Brazil successfully challenged the U.S. cotton subsidies before the WTO.
See WTO Appellate Body, United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R (Sept. 8,
2004).
8.
See Outsiders Aren’t Helping—What Future for Moldova?, ECONOMIST, Feb. 15, 2003, at 48.
9.
Here, I mostly focus on an international dimension of the Marxian apocalypse. For an excellent
recount of its domestic dimension, see WILLIAM GREIDER, ONE WORLD, READY OR NOT: THE MANIC
LOGIC OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM 39-53 (1998). See also After Communism—Marx: The Post-Communist
Karl Marx, ECONOMIST, Dec. 21, 2002, at 17.
10.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT 1947].
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ture,11 has contributed to unprecedented global economic growth during the
past half century.12 GATT has served as an icon of, or an agent for, globalization.13 Many once impoverished countries, such as South Korea, were
able to escape from their miserable economic status through a rewarding
mechanism of international trade—successful accumulation of foreign reserves earned by export and re-investment of this capital for further economic growth.14 This unremitting march of international commerce and its
liberal agenda climaxed with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the launch of
the WTO. The WTO succeeded GATT, implementing an even more ambitious vision and agenda.15 A nirvana of global economic integration appeared to be just a few steps away.
However, deep beneath the wave of liberal optimism and promises of
free trade ran an undercurrent of lagging development and poverty suffered
by the poor and unfortunate.16 Globalization during the last two decades led
many once-poor countries to a successful integration to the world market
through a dramatic shift in their exports from primary commodities to
manufactured goods and services. Therefore, three billion “new globalizers,” such as China, India and Mexico, were enabled to experience a large
scale of poverty reduction. However, countries with around two billion people, most living in remote corners of Asia, Africa, and Europe, fail to be
included in the mainstream of global economic activities. The result of this
frustrating phenomenon is that poverty in these countries is greater now
than it was twenty years ago.17
11.
See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 35-37 (2d ed. 1997) [hereinafter WORLD TRADING SYSTEM].
12.
For instance, during the period of 1965 to 1999, the average annual growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP) was 4.2% in the low and middle income countries and 3.2% in the high income countries; during the same period, the average annual growth rates of the exportation of goods and services
were 5.3% and 5.9%, respectively. WORLD BANK, 2001 WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 24-27
(2002), available at http://www.worldbank.org/data/wdi2001/pdfs/tab1_4.pdf (last visited Feb. 23,
2004).
13.
Globalization can be broadly defined as “the widening, deepening and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects of contemporary social life, from the cultural to the criminal, the
financial to the spiritual.” GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS: POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND CULTURE 2 (David
Held et al. eds., 1999). However, this Article focuses on an economic, more narrow aspect of trade and
globalization. See id. at 149-88 (discussing global trade and global markets).
14.
Regarding the role of trade in the economic development of Korea, see THE MULTILATERAL
TRADING SYSTEM IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD (Lee-Jay Cho & Yoon Hyung Kim eds., 2000); TUN-JEN
CHENG ET AL., INSTITUTIONS, ECONOMIC POLICY AND GROWTH IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND
TAIWAN PROVINCE OF CHINA (1996); and DAVID C. COLE ET AL., THE KOREAN ECONOMY: ISSUES OF
DEVELOPMENT (1980).
15.
Cf. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Transformation of the World Trading System Through the
1994 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L. 161, 189 (1995) (arguing that the 1994 WTO Agreement “completes the original design of the Bretton Woods system, and
reduces the existing fragmentation of international economic law, by a ‘global integration law’ for international movements of goods, services, persons, investments and payments”).
16.
Nicholas Stern, Senior Vice President and Chief Economist of the World Bank, observed that
“[a]bout one-fifth of the world’s population lives on less than $1 per day,” which is “unacceptable in a
world of such plenty.” Nicholas Stern, Foreword to GLOBALIZATION, GROWTH, AND POVERTY:
BUILDING AN INCLUSIVE WORLD ECONOMY, at ix (A World Bank Policy Research Report, 2002) [hereinafter GLOBALIZATION, GROWTH, AND POVERTY].
17.
Id. at x, 31-32. In the same context, a recent report by the United Nations Conference on Trade
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Given these circumstances, developing countries (the South)18 participated vigorously in the historic Uruguay Round (UR) negotiations conand Development (UNCTAD) sharply observed as follows:
[T]he trade performance of developing countries during the past two decades has been uneven. A number of countries, concentrated in East and South-East Asia, have been able to expand and diversify their exports of manufactures and increase their share of world trade. On
the other hand, many least developed countries (LDCs) and other commodity-dependent developing countries have lost shares. In manufactures, the successful export performance of
some countries does not always involve increasing domestic value added. A number of developing countries continue to depend on the export of undynamic products with low income
elasticity and low value added, from both the primary and manufacturing sectors. Many labour-intensive manufactures exported by developing countries are behaving increasingly like
commodities, with a risk of market saturation that could lead to a fallacy of composition. At
the same time, many middle-income developing countries are finding it difficult to upgrade
their productive and technological profile, and they remain dependent on imported parts and
components, as well as on design and technology skills.
UNCTAD, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT REPORT 33 (2002) [hereinafter UNCTAD TDR 2002], available
at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs//tdr2002_en.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2004). See also South Summit
Hits Global Economic Gap: Havana Conference Assails “Marginalization” of Developing Countries, 14
AFR. RECOVERY 24 (2000), available at http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol14no2/g77summ
t.htm. But cf. International Monetary Fund, Global Trade Liberalization and the Developing Countries II
(IMF Issues Brief, Nov. 2001) [hereinafter Global Trade Liberalization] (observing that the reasons for
the marginalization of countries are complex, including “deep-seated structural problems, weak policy
frameworks and institutions, and protection at home and abroad”), available at http://www.imf.org/exter
nal/np/exr/ib/2001/110801.htm#i; Alexander J. Yeats et al., What Caused Sub-Saharan Africa’s Marginalization in World Trade, 4 FIN. & DEV. 38, 38 (1996) (observing that the anticompetitive policies of the
developing countries are culpable for marginalization, rather than trade barriers), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/fandd/english/abstract/1296/06a1296.htm.
18.
There is no official definition of “developing countries.” Countries often declare themselves to
be developing countries, in which case other countries can challenge that declaration. Within the WTO
system, developing countries are treated more favorably than developed countries under certain circumstances. For instance, developing countries may be given a longer period for implementing their obligations. However, these special rights under the WTO do not necessarily apply to other occasions, such as
the granting of the Generalized System of Preference (GSP) status, which is determined unilaterally by
donor countries. In the case of Least Developed Countries (LDCs), the UN officially designated 50
countries as the LDCs. See WTO, Development: Definition (Who Are the Developing Countries in the
WTO?), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/d1who_e.htm (last visited Feb. 23,
2004). On the other hand, a wide spectrum of developmental stages exists among developing countries.
Markedly, divergent paths in terms of GDP per capita growth rate have been witnessed in the 1990s
between “more globalized” developing countries, such as China, India, Uganda and Vietnam, and “less
globalized” developing countries, such as many sub-Saharan African countries and the former Soviet
Union. GLOBALIZATION, GROWTH, AND POVERTY, supra note 16, at 5, 35. These more globalized developing countries, or new globalizers, are characterized by open trade policies, adequate basic education and well-established legal systems. Id. at 35. On the other hand, three schools of thought, which all
make sense to some extent, explain why these less globalized developing countries have been marginalized: first, poor domestic institutions as well as policies are culpable, but they can be still improved (the
“Join the Club” view); second, inherent disadvantages of unfavorable geography and climate are to
blame (the “Geographic Disadvantage” view); and third, as a result of poor policies these countries
permanently missed the opportunity to industrialize (the “Missed the Boat” view). Id. at 7, 39-40. Cf.
ANNE O. KRUEGER, TRADE POLICIES AND DEVELOPING NATIONS 59-61 (1995) (discussing “[d]ifferent
[g]roups and [i]nterests” of developing countries). Despite the existence of such a wide spectrum, when
negotiating on certain issues vis-à-vis developed countries, coalition among developing countries may
still be a conceivable strategy. See generally Rajiv Kumar, Developing-Country Coalitions in International Trade Negotiations, in THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN WORLD TRADE: POLICIES AND
BARGAINING STRATEGIES 205-21 (Diana Tussie & David Glover eds., 1993) [hereinafter THE
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN WORLD TRADE] (discussing the experience of the umbrella coalition during
the period leading up to the Uruguay Round); David Glover & Diana Tussie, Developing Countries in
World Trade: Implications for Bargaining, in THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN WORLD TRADE, supra, at
225-41.
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ducted throughout the late eighties and the early nineties.19 A grand deal
between the developed countries (the North) and the South finally launched
the WTO in 1995. The South, in exchange for extended market access to the
North, accepted the entire UR results as a “single undertaking.” This single
undertaking included various new sectors, such as intellectual property
rights and services, which the North had strongly demanded.20 Yet in the
course of implementing the UR deal, the South became increasingly frustrated, chiefly because the North, contrary to its original commitment (the
improved market access in development-sensitive products, such as agricultural products and textiles), continued to maintain high trade barriers to imports on those primary, labor-intensive products, such as agricultural products and textiles—the only products that the South can offer to trade.21 Such
protection in rich countries costs developing countries over $100 billion per
year, twice the total sum of foreign aid from North to South.22 Simply put,
the balance sheet of the WTO enterprise has revealed only the “uneven distribution”23 of benefits among rich and poor members, thus failing to materialize the goal of substantial and sustainable economic development. Consequently, seven years under the WTO has not narrowed the global income
gap between the poor and the rich—the gap has widened.24

19.
For a comprehensive survey concerning the impact of the Uruguay Round on developing countries, see generally THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Will Martin & L. Alan
Winters eds., 1996).
20.
UNCTAD TDR 2002, supra note 17, at 34.
Participation in the WTO—like the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) before
it—has brought developing countries a number of important benefits, but also poses new and
difficult challenges. Their willingness to participate has been motivated by the hope of improved and more secure access to markets, particularly in the industrialized countries, and the
expectation that the means to enforce acquired rights through the dispute settlement mechanism would more than offset a loss in policy autonomy that follows from their taking on an
increasing number of obligations, including market opening and the implementation of rules
in new areas.
Id. See also J. Michael Finger & Philip Schuler, Implementation of Uruguay Round Commitments: The
Development Challenge, in DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE WTO: A PRO-ACTIVE AGENDA 115-29
(Bernard M. Hoekman & Will Martin eds., 2001) [hereinafter A PRO-ACTIVE AGENDA]; Evelyn Su, The
Winners and Losers: The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and Its
Effects on Developing Countries, 23 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 169, 195-218 (2000) (exploring the effects of the
Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) on the economic development of
developing countries).
21.
Joseph E. Stiglitz, Two Principles for the Next Round or, How to Bring Developing Countries in
from the Cold, 23 WORLD ECON. 437, 437-38 (2000) (criticizing the developed countries’ “hypocrisy”
when they continuously exhort developing countries towards further market openings, while they still
maintain trade barriers in sectors of natural comparative advantage for developing countries), available
at http://www.worldbank.org/knowledge/chiefecon/articles/geneva.pdf; see also Celso L.N. Amorim,
The WTO from the Perspective of a Developing Country, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 95, 96-99 (2000)
(criticizing the WTO’s “development deficit” in the areas of agriculture and textiles).
22.
GLOBALIZATION, GROWTH, AND POVERTY, supra note 16, at 9, 53.
23.
Mike Moore, Address at the Conference of African Trade Ministers, Algiers (Sept. 23, 1999)
[hereinafter Challenges and Opportunities] (“There must be something in the pie for everyone. Not pie in
the sky when we die, but pie on the table.”), at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spmm_e/spmm07_e.
htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2004).
24.
Global Gap Rising, World Bank Study Shows, UN WIRE, Jan. 18, 2002, at http://www.unfounda
tion.org/unwire/util/display_stories.asp?objid=23173 (last visited Feb. 23, 2004).
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Under these circumstances, the third WTO Ministerial Conference in
Seattle was doomed from the start.25 In addition to general antiglobalization sentiments, 26 the apparently irreconcilable fissure between the
North and the South was one of the main culprits in the collapse of the Seattle Conference.27 The “Northern Agenda” included the issues of climate
change and regulatory enhancement in the areas of health, environment, and
labor. These issues clashed with the “Southern Agenda,” driven by improved access to the developed countries’ markets for agricultural and textile products.28 With unpleasant memories of tear gas and rubber bullets in
the streets of Seattle still vividly haunting the WTO, the fourth Ministerial
Conference was held in Doha, Qatar in November 2001.29 Once again, the
chasm between North and South almost derailed the launch of the new
round of negotiations for trade liberalization under the auspices of the
WTO. It would have certainly done so without such extraordinary events as
the global recession and the September 11 attacks. Consequently, some
members were forced to be conciliatory in order to seal a deal. Ironically,
this inclement climate drove negotiators from both rich and poor countries
to reach a compromise, motivated by a prevailing understanding that the
global trading system could go astray and eventually fail without an impetus
at such a critical point in time.30 Yet despite the historic launch of a new
round after painstaking efforts, implementation has been depressingly
minimal, particularly in areas of development.31 This evanescent nature of
the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) was painfully confirmed by the eve
of the fifth Ministerial Conference in Cancún, Mexico in September 2003.32
Clearly, development is not a new issue in international trade law. Since
the birth of GATT, development has been discussed among contracting par25.
26.
27.

See Stiglitiz, supra note 21, at 437.
See Rob Norton, Not So Fast: Anti-Trade/Pro-Trade, FORTUNE, Jan. 10, 2000, at 40.
GLOBALIZATION, GROWTH, AND POVERTY, supra note 16, at 60.
The Seattle WTO ministerial meeting failed to launch a new round, not because of the protests in the streets, but because the major trading powers lacked the political will to accommodate the interests of developing countries . . . . In order for developing countries to have
confidence in a new round, rich countries must deliver on commitments made in the past,
such as accelerating the agricultural trade negotiations and phasing out quotas on textiles and
clothing.
Id. (quoting the recent report of the UN High-Level Panel on Financing for Development); see also
Diana Tussie & Miguel F. Lengyel, Developing Countries: Turning Participation into Influence, in
DEVELOPMENT, TRADE, AND THE WTO: A HANDBOOK 485, 491 (Bernard Hoekman et al. eds., 2002)
[hereinafter HANDBOOK] (observing that “[a]fter the significant concessions made in the Uruguay
Round, developing countries felt entitled to be included in the green-room process”).
28.
Symposium, Issues Confronting the World Trading System—Summary Reports by the Moderators, at www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/ngo_symp2001_modreps_e.htm (last visited Feb. 23,
2004); see also Scott Vaughan, Trade and Environment: Some North-South Considerations, 27
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 591, 592 (1994) (detecting the “North-South impasse” in the area of environmental
policies).
29.
WTO, The Fourth Ministerial Conference (An Official Website), at http://www.wto.org/english/t
hewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/min01_e.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2004).
30.
See infra Part II.B.3.
31.
See infra Part II.B.3.
32.
See Cho, A Bridge Too Far, supra note 2, at 219.
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ties. Despite this long-standing engagement, efforts to deliver any substantial and meaningful outcome to underdeveloped countries have failed for the
most part. Many gestures have been made, but few actions have been taken;
semblances of developmental aid, but no genuine assistance. Even the rare
aid program concentrated on affirmative action-type measures such as tariff
preferences. Tariff preferences, however, are doomed to fail since they do
not reflect the development demands of the recipients, but depend strictly
on the budgetary or political considerations of the donors. To wit, the aid
programs have been handled in a temporary, spasmodic and unilateral dimension, at the mercy of rich donor countries. Most products in which developing countries enjoy a comparative advantage—and which, therefore,
could be a potential threat to domestic industries in rich countries producing
similar products—have been deliberately singled out from the list of goods
receiving preferential access. Admittedly, the WTO has recently geared up
to respond directly to the demands of the developing countries through the
concept of “capacity-building.” Although this new direction of development
assistance appears to be agreeable, and even laudable, the chronic quandary
of a lack of physical and political capital has rendered previous development programs fruitless and now fundamentally threatens the current initiative.
This Article focuses on the current development-related problems in the
global trading system. A widening income gap and widespread poverty
among trading nations denote the WTO’s Gesellschaftian nature—interest
and power—resulting in structural distortion and manipulation. This Article
maintains that the global trading system can achieve its development agenda
and become fair and legitimate only through a critical paradigmatic transformation enabled by the configuration of the “WTO’s Gemeinschaft.” This
Article observes that a fundamental legal precept, the “Law of Nations” (jus
gentium), plays a critical role in actualizing this communitarian telos. Part II
redefines the global trading system through the theoretical lens of “Gesellschaft,” a term articulated by the German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies in
the late nineteenth century. Part II tracks down futile attempts, under the
Gesellschaftian limitation, to tackle development issues and consequent
distributional injustice. Part III highlights and problematizes the Gesellschaftian limitation and resultant development failure as it enumerates the
causes and effects of that failure: persistent protectionism, regulatory unilateralism, and rhetoric without action. Part IV then attempts to address the
development problem by overcoming the WTO’s Gesellschaftian limitation
through exercising a communitarian paradigm shift and constructing, with
the vehicle of the Law of Nations, the WTO’s Gemeinschaft. This consists
of a dual agenda of free trade and development assistance implemented and
vindicated in an atmosphere of global empathy. Part V concludes that an
ideal project of WTO’s Gemeinschaft leads us to transform our perspective
from could (right) to should (duty).
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II. THE FLAWED GLOBAL GESELLSCHAFT: DEVELOPMENT LOST
A. The Gesellschaftian Interpretation
of the Global Trading System
Tönnies’ illustrious dichotomy of Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft, often
translated as “society” and “community” respectively, provides simple yet
powerful insights into human interactions and group dynamics. Gemeinschaft in its original form, the “Gemeinschaft of Blood,” is defined as a
natural human connection bestowed by birth and family. This can be developed into the “Gemeinschaft of Locality,” based on a common habitation or
locale.33 In contrast, Gesellschaft is defined as an artificial human connection that people build up with the intent and interest to work together.34 Gemeinschaft connotes the “relationships in traditional agrarian societies,” and
thus a rural life, while Gesellschaft connotes “sterilized associations which
exist in the realm of ‘business, travel, or sciences,’” and thus an urban life.35
The construction of GATT as a global Gesellschaft departs from the
historical path-dependent structure of Tönnies’ original theory to the extent
that GATT has not directly evolved from any pre-existing Gemeinschaft.36
However, one can still discover useful corollaries of a Gesellschaft in
GATT.37 The genesis of the modern global trading system, GATT was a
“contract” among trading nations to achieve the collective purposes of reducing and eliminating trade barriers such as tariffs and quotas. Thus, the
original twenty-four “contracting parties” signed and ratified the multi-party
contract, constituting a positivistic form of agreement. The prototypes of
GATT were in fact interwar U.S. bilateral trade agreements aiming for reciprocal tariff reduction negotiation.38 Therefore, GATT presupposes bargains and quid pro quo, and requires the existence of “nullification” or “impairment” of benefits—similar to the concept of “injury” in the law of con33.
Daniel S. Reimer, The Role of “Community” in the Pacific Northwest Logging Debate, 66 U.
COLO. L. REV. 223, 229 (1995); FERDINAND TÖNNIES, COMMUNITY AND SOCIETY 33-34, 35, 41-44, 7678 (1967), reprinted in THE SOCIOLOGY OF COMMUNITY 7-10 (Colin Bell & Howard Newby eds., 1974)
[hereinafter THE SOCIOLOGY OF COMMUNITY].
34.
Reimer, supra note 33, at 229; THE SOCIOLOGY OF COMMUNITY, supra note 33, at 7-10.
35.
Reimer, supra note 33, at 229 (quoting THE SOCIOLOGY OF COMMUNITY, supra note 33, at 710).
36.
THE CLASSIC STATEMENTS, supra note 6.
37.
See Chi Carmody, When “Cultural Identity Was Not at Issue”: Thinking about Canada—
Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, 30 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 231, 237 (1999) (observing that
the tension between trade and culture is a “modern manifestation of the age-old debate between society
(Gesellschaft) and community (Gemeinschaft)”). Carmody’s main argument is that “too much Gesellschaft” corrodes the familiar local culture which represents Gemeinschaft. Id.
38.
Robert E. Hudec, The GATT Legal System: A Diplomat’s Jurisprudence, 4 J. WORLD TRADE L.
615, 616-36 (1970) [hereinafter A Diplomat’s Jurisprudence]; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Dispute
Settlement System of the World Trade Organization and the Evolution of the GATT Dispute Settlement
System Since 1948, 31 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1157, 1171 (1994); Ernest H. Preeg, TRADERS AND
DIPLOMATS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE KENNEDY ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS UNDER THE GENERAL
AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE 23-24 (1970); Edwin Vermulst & Bart Driessen, An Overview of
the WTO Dispute Settlement System and Its Relationship with the Uruguay Round Agreements, 29 J.
WORLD TRADE 131, 136 (1995).
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tracts.39 Interestingly, Tönnies himself conceived of a global Gesellschaft
with the international nature of merchants and metaphorized it as a metropolis where world commerce and traffic converge.40
However, the statist structure of this global Gesellschaft, which was inherited from the Treaties of Westphalia, tends to invite mercantilist competition and the creation of national wealth, as states are likely to be obsessed
with exportation and sensitive to importation.41 Moreover, the contract and
negotiation characteristics of the global Gesellschaft tend to put its operation at the mercy of power dynamics among contracting parties. Simply put,
you are likely to enjoy a better bargain if you are the superior, more powerful party vis-à-vis your counterpart in a contract. The mere existence of a
convention seldom corrects the power disparity, mainly because the convention itself is a negotiational outcome. Worse, if you happen to be a very
small party you can easily be trivialized and excluded from the negotiation
itself; what remains is to accept the outcome (contract) as a fait accompli no
matter how it affects you. Under these circumstances, even important convention principles can be bent and clouded—not via violations per se, but
through exemptions and reservations for the political convenience of the
rich and powerful.
Yet, more troubling than the blatant legal impotence of the global Gesellschaft is the nature of the law and order itself. Under the current WTO
system, legal remedies ultimately hinge on enforcement mechanisms, often
sanctions or retaliation.42 Thus, international commerce is maintained in a
belligerent situation through “underlying mutual fear” and veiled hostility
toward each other.43 In the name of sanctions or retaliation, the WTO authorizes and accordingly privatizes the unilateral imposition of trade barriers
against the condemned, the very outcome which the WTO aims to eliminate.44 In this regard, Steve Charnovitz trenchantly observes that “the World
Health Organization does not authorize one party to spread viruses to another. The World Intellectual Property Organization does not fight piracy
with piracy. So the WTO’s use of trade restrictions to promote freer trade is
bizarre.”45
39.
Admittedly, most treaties would be some kind of contract from a positivistic standpoint in that
they are based on the consent of contracting governments. See HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 438-39 (Robert W. Tucker ed., 2d rev. ed. 1966); Steven R. Ratner & Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Appraising the Methods of International Law: A Prospectus for Readers, 93 AM. J. INT’L L.
291, 293 (1999).
40.
THE CLASSIC STATEMENTS, supra note 6.
41.
Michael M’Gongile, Between Globalism and Territoriality: The International Constitution and
the Challenge of Ecological Legitimacy, 15 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 159, 166 (2002).
42.
See Sungjoon Cho, The Nature of Remedies in International Trade Law, 65 U. PITT. L. REV.
763, 777 (2004) [hereinafter Cho, Remedies].
43.
THE CLASSIC STATEMENTS, supra note 6.
44.
Steve Charnovitz, Should the Teeth Be Pulled?: An Analysis of WTO Sanctions, in THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT E. HUDEC 602,
622 (Daniel L. M. Kennedy & James D. Southwick eds., 2002) [hereinafter POLITICAL ECONOMY].
45.
Id.; see also Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Remedies Along with Rights: Institutional Reform in the
New GATT, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 477, 487 (1994) (observing that retaliation is not favored under the DSU
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Furthermore, this enforcement mechanism itself reveals power imbalances between the rich and the poor in the international law arena.46 Because the mechanism leaves retaliation in the hands of the winner, even if a
poor member attempts to retaliate against its rich trading partner, such retaliation is likely to be ineffective due to the discrepancy between their economic sizes.47 It is not the incompleteness of the enforcement mechanism
which is biased against the poor,48 but rather the Gesellschaftian nature itself which begets this developmental dilemma. The WTO once acknowledged this quandary when Ecuador attempted to retaliate against the EU in
the course of the notorious banana saga. As a WTO arbitration panel pointedly observed:
Given the difficulties and the specific circumstances of this case
which involves a developing country Member, it could be that Ecuador may find itself in a situation where it is not realistic or possible for it to implement the suspension authorized by the [Dispute
Settlement Understanding] for the full amount of the level of nullification and impairment estimated by us in all of the sectors and/or
under all agreements mentioned above combined. The present text
of the DSU does not offer a solution for such an eventuality.49
In addition, considering negative future political ramifications that such
treacherous retaliation may precipitate against powerful trading partners,
poor countries are not likely to opt for such an ephemeral, Pyrrhic victory.50
Therefore, in the banana saga, Ecuador, even as a winner, had to stomach
further negotiation with the EU to resolve the situation without retaliation
because of the price it would have paid otherwise.51 On the contrary, big,
because it is “by definition” against the WTO rules and also erects a new trade barrier).
46.
See Cho, Remedies, supra note 42, at 785.
47.
POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 44, at 625-26; Joost Pauwelyn, Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules are Rules—Toward a More Collective Approach, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 335,
338 (2000).
48.
See Henrik Horn & Petros C. Mavroidis, Remedies in the WTO Dispute Settlement System and
Developing Country Interests (1999), http://www1.worldbank.org/wbiep/trade/papers_2000/BPdisput.P
DF (last visited Feb. 23, 2004). Horn and Mavroidis argue that the lack of a workable sanction mechanism in the WTO tends to privatize the sanction against violators, which puts “economically and politically weak” countries in a disadvantageous position. Id. at 2.
49.
European Communities, Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, Recourse to Arbitration by European Communities under Article 22. 6 of the DSU, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU
(Mar. 24, 2000), at para. 177 (emphasis added); see also Robert E. Hudec, The Adequacy of WTO Dispute Settlement Remedies: A Developing Country Perspective, in HANDBOOK, supra note 27, at 81, 84
(observing that the WTO’s greater emphasis on retaliation makes the dispute settlement system even
more “one-sided” than before, favoring larger developed countries); David Palmeter & Stanimir A.
Alexandrov, “Inducing Compliance” in WTO Dispute Settlement, in POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note
44, at 646, 662.
50.
See Cho, Remedies, supra note 42, at 786.
51.
Banana Dispute: Ecuador and EC Hold Talks to Avoid WTO Dispute, 5 BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE
NEWS DIG., Apr. 24, 2001 (quoting an informed source stating that “[i]t is difficult for Ecuador as a
small developing country with severe economic problems to resist major pressure from the US and the
EU over the banana issue.”), available at http://www.ictsd.org/html/weekly/24-04-01/story3.htm.
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rich countries can influence small, poor countries by a mere threat of sanctions simply because the impact of retaliation to the latter would be so damaging.
B. Unearthing Development Disparity
in the Global Gesellschaft
1. Development Disparity as a Structural Dilemma
At first glance, development appears to be such a natural corollary of
international trade that the relationship does not seem to merit any particular
inquiry or analysis. That is to say, countries trade with each other ultimately
for the sake of their own economic development.52 The preamble of GATT
also describes the fundamental purpose of international trade as various
aspects of economic development, such as “raising standards of living,”
“ensuring full employment,” and producing a “large and steadily growing
volume of real income.”53 Classical international economic theory also supports this general proposition. According to the theory, trade leads each
participant to specialize in products in which it retains comparative, not
necessarily absolute, advantages over its trading partner. Such specialization
reduces the average cost to produce goods for trade due to economies of
scale. The collective welfare of trading nations increases when trading partners exchange specialized goods through export and import since resources
are reallocated in a more efficient manner than they were in a pre-trade (autarky) situation.54 Therefore, every country taking part in this exchange
game is expected to increase its welfare, whether it is rich or poor.55 In this
sense, development may not be a special, independent agenda at all in inter52.
See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Frankel & David Romer, Does Trade Cause Growth?, 89 AM. ECON. REV.
379 (1999) (proving empirically that trade raises income). Cf. JAMES M. CYPHER & JAMES L. DIETZ,
THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 105-204 (1997) (introducing theories of development and
underdevelopment including classical (Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, David Ricardo, and Karl Marx),
neo-classical (Robert Solow), unbalanced growth, and heterodox theories (dependency analysis) of
economic development); GERALD M. MEIER & JAMES E. RAUCH, LEADING ISSUES IN ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 213-40 (7th ed. 2000) (highlighting the importance of education and human capital in
economic development); but cf. DANI RODRIK, U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF
TRADE: AS IF DEVELOPMENT REALLY MATTERED 10 (Oct. 2001) (arguing that not trade but “domestic
institutional innovations” contribute to economic development), available at http://www.undp.org/mainu
ndp/propoor/docs/pov_globalgovernancetrade_pub.pdf.
53.
WTO Agreement pmbl. WTO Agreement Annex 1A incorporates a document labeled GATT
1994, which is essentially GATT 1947, as amended through the Uruguay Round, along with all the
ancillary agreements pertaining to GATT 1947, as modified. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1994, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 1, Annex 1A, RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND,
supra note 1, 33 I.L.M. 1154 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994].
54.
RICHARD E. CAVES ET AL., WORLD TRADE AND PAYMENTS: AN INTRODUCTION 38-48 (7th ed.
1996) [hereinafter WORLD TRADE AND PAYMENTS].
55.
This mutually beneficial effect of trade, though it is derived mostly from an economic standpoint, can also be glimpsed in the early history of GATT, which was characterized by a parity of obligations among contracting parties, regardless of economic development. See ROBERT E. HUDEC,
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 4 (1987) [hereinafter HUDEC, DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES].
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national trade; development is, in fact, presumed in trade.56 In sum, the general proposition that trade connotes economic development seems to be
supported not only by intuition but also by theory.
However, the simple, yet appealing, original vision of the global Gesellschaft is in fact non-existent in the real world. A somber reality check soon
reveals that the aforementioned free trade proposition is subject to limitations and qualifications which expose the vulnerability and disadvantage of
the poor, less-developed trading partners vis-à-vis the rich, fully industrialized ones. These vulnerabilities and disadvantages can be approached and
recounted in a variety of ways. First, even economists admit that economically dominant countries may strategically improve their terms of trade at
the expense of their smaller trading partners using such mechanisms as “optimal tariffs.”57 On the other hand, under certain circumstances, overconcentrated production of commodities whose world demands are highly
inelastic, such as agricultural products, tends to lower real incomes of exporting developing countries through a deterioration of their own terms of
trade. For instance, when Brazil decides to increase coffee production in
pursuit of the theory of comparative advantage, it may encounter (and precipitate) declining prices of coffee and consequently diminished real income
merely because of the vast amount of coffee production in the world market.
This rather paradoxical phenomenon, which is called “immiserizing
growth,”58 casts the counterintuitive and frustrating insight that hard work
and a good crop do not necessarily bring prosperity.
Secondly, developing countries or least-developed countries (LDCs) are
still largely blocked from exporting their products of natural comparative
advantage to their trading partners. This state of unfree trade, in most cases,
originates in domestic politics. In a horizontal sense, regional economic
blocs exclusively share preferential and thus discriminatory treatment,
which tends to hurt non-member countries, whose economic scale is relatively small and who are consequently most affected by exclusive policies.59
56.
This basic position on trade and development has recently been reiterated at the UN’s International Conference on Financing for Development held in Monterrey, Mexico in March, 2002 by a number of world leaders, such as the U.S. President George W. Bush (arguing that “the vast majority of
financing for development comes not from aid but from trade and domestic capital and foreign investment”), the Iranian Finance Minister Tahmasb Mazaheri (pointing “to trade as ‘the most important
vehicle for financing of development’”), the World Bank President James Wolfensohn (stressing that all
trading nations would eventually “benefit from more open trade”), the IMF Managing Director Horst
Koehler (describing “trade as ‘the most import avenue for self-help’”), and the WTO Director-General
Mike Moore (pointing “out that ‘poor countries need to grow their way out of poverty and trade can
serve as a key engine of that growth’”). Mixed Reaction on Trade in Financing for Development Outcome, 6 BRIDGES WKLY TRADE NEWS DIG., Mar. 26, 2002, available at http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/02
-03-26/story3.htm.
57.
See JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS:
CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT 22-24 (4th ed. 2002) [hereinafter LEGAL PROBLEMS].
58.
WORLD TRADE AND PAYMENTS, supra note 54, at 64-67.
59.
The creation or enlargement of preferential regional trading blocs among developed countries or
between developing and developed countries is likely to worsen the marginalization of the LDCs. In
general, those blocs diffuse pre-existing sector-specific protections via the common external trade policies that all members of the blocs adopt. Therefore, this regional expansion of protection impedes not
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In a vertical sense, powerful domestic industries in the developed countries
often lobby against the importation of competitive products from developing countries that enjoy a comparative advantage in the production of those
goods. Under either situation, the comparative advantage of developing
countries fails to be realized, eventually dampening their development process.
Third, non-trade factors continue to constrain poor countries, encroaching on any modicum of a developmental base that they manage to establish.
For instance, heavy foreign debts borne by most of the LDCs frustrate tradeinduced development because a large portion of money earned through
trade must be devoted to the service of debt.60 Furthermore, a number of
LDCs, particularly those located in sub-Saharan Africa, regularly suffer
from catastrophic events such as civil wars, pandemic diseases, and natural
disasters that international trade seems so powerless to cope with.61
Critically, however, a new factor has begun to contribute to the increasing developmental gap between rich and poor nations. Under the banner of
the welfare state, the governments of the rich countries have been eager to
enhance the quality of their social regulations in areas such as human health
and the environment, thereby both increasing the number of new regulations
and reinforcing pre-existing ones.62 In addition, unseen hazards combined
with new scientific revelations have fueled consumer angst and led to deep
regulatory intervention, as in the case of genetically modified (GM) foods.63
Heightened levels of regulatory protection require sufficient capital, technology, education, and institutions, none of which are available to the necessary extent in poor countries.64 Only developed, industrialized countries
only North-South trade, but also South-South trade through serious trade diversion, resulting in a disaster
for the LDCs since their economic development depends upon the export of only one or a few products,
such as agricultural products or textiles, on which they enjoy comparative advantages vis-à-vis developed countries. Sungjoon Cho, Breaking the Barrier Between Regionalism and Multilateralism: A New
Perspective on Trade Regionalism, 42 HARV. INT’L L.J. 419, 449 (2001).
60.
See infra subpart IV.B.3 (discussing the insufficiency of market access as a tool for development).
61.
See, e.g., Jeffrey Sachs, Helping the World’s Poorest, ECONOMIST, Aug. 14, 1999, available at
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidinthenews/articles/sf9108.html. Sachs emphasized that too many countries are “stuck in a trap of poverty” from which they will not be able to escape without a true international partnership. Jim Wurst, Poverty II: Poorest Countries Can Never Escape Without Aid, Sachs Says,
UN WIRE, June 18, 2002, at http://www.unwire.org/UNWire/20020618/27090_story.asp; see also Jeffrey D. Sachs, A New Framework for Globalization, in EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND LEGITIMACY: THE
MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM 63-77 (Roger B. Porter et al. eds., 2001); cf.
Richard Blackhurst et al., Options for Improving Africa’s Participation in the WTO, in A PRO-ACTIVE
AGENDA, supra note 20, at 95-114; David F. Luke, Trade-Related Capacity Building for Enhanced
African Participation in the Global Economy, in HANDBOOK, supra note 27, at 509-15 (regarding various options for the integration of Africa into the global economy).
62.
See, e.g., ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), Agriculture, Food and Fisheries, available at http://www.oecd.org/topic/0,2686,en_2649_37401_1_1_1_1_374
01,00.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2004).
63.
Cf. Judson O. Berkey, The Regulation of Genetically Modified Foods, ASIL INSIGHTS (Oct.
1999) (regarding diverging regulatory philosophies on biotechnology), at http://www.asil.org/insights/in
sigh37.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2004).
64.
In the same context, Professor John Jackson highlighted the importance of “human institutions”
in benefiting from the market economy, citing pre-eminent economists like Ronald Coase and Douglas
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enjoy such an infrastructure.65 To other countries that are incapable of establishing the necessary infrastructure, trading with rich countries while complying with their high regulatory threshold is prohibitive. 66 Therefore, poor
countries fail to integrate themselves into the global economy via trade and
are pushed toward the edge of the global Gesellschaft.
Against this backdrop, it is fair to say that a “development disparity,”
not just development, is entrenched in the current global trading system,
where a classical economic philosophy on trade and development generates
only limited practical significance.67 For the purpose of this Article, development disparity can be defined as the existence of disproportionate levels
of economic development between the rich and the poor trading nations
resulting from non-trade, structural reasons such as infrastructure disparity.
Although the development disparity has been consistently manifested in the
troublesome tension of North versus South, it has recently been more
dramatized and complicated due to a stampede of entrants into the WTO,
who used to be subject to the centralized economic system but now struggle
to overcome chronic poverty and underdevelopment by actively tapping into
the global trading system. If left neglected, the development disparity will
further marginalize the poor, developing countries, and consequently affect
the rich countries in various ways in our highly interdependent world. A
cataclysmic global recession may occur due to the collapse of poor countries’ economies and the subsequent decline of global purchasing power
through a chain effect. Humanitarian disasters would follow, represented by
starvation and a flood of refugees. The absence of a resolute approach to
development disparity not only creates an international economic system
malfunction, but also generates the vast economic injustice that forces many
poor nations to remain in their current miserable economic status despite
their best efforts. This is the very reason why development disparity should
be a serious, independent agenda in the WTO’s Gesellschaft.

North. John H. Jackson, Reflections on the MJIL Special Issue, 20 MICH. J. INT’L L. 183, 185 (1999);
John H. Jackson, Global Economics and International Economic Law, 1 J. INT’L ECON. L. 1 (1998),
available at http://www.jiel.oupjournals.org. Cf. Implementing Agenda 21: Report of the SecretaryGeneral, U.N. ESCOR, 2d Sess., para. 192, U.N. Doc. E/CN.17/2002/P.C. 2/7 (2001) [hereinafter
Agenda 21 Report].
65.
See Stiglitz, supra note 21, at 440 (observing that “underdevelopment is an inherent reflection of
poorly functioning markets”); EDWARD F. BUFFIE, TRADE POLICY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 5 (2001)
(questioning an “export-oriented” trade strategy in poor countries where market failures are common).
66.
See THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2002: BUILDING INSTITUTIONS FOR
MARKETS 3-27 (2002) (highlighting the role of institutions in development); CARLOS A. MAGARIÑOS,
MARGINALIZATION VERSUS PROSPERITY: REFLECTIONS ON THE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 1 (2000)
[hereinafter MARGINALIZATION VERSUS PROSPERITY] (observing that “inadequate flows of information,
skills and knowledge,” constitute a barrier to development), available at http://www.unido.org/doc/5002
3.htmls (last visited Feb. 23, 2004).
67.
For a more radical view, see Raj Bhala, Marxist Origins of the “Anti-Third World” Claim, 24
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 132, 133 (2000) (submitting that the “WTO is anti-development, and international
trade law helps tilt the playing field on which the great game of trade is played against developing countries”).
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2. Development Under the Early Gesellschaft (GATT 1947):
Spasmodic Charity
In the pre-GATT era, colonialism represented the most conspicuous relationship between rich and poor countries.68 Yet, its pattern varied depending on the parent state and on the location of the respective colonies. According to Robert Hudec, colonies in Asia and Africa were formally linked
to their parent countries, such as England and France, forming “de jure
colonies,” while those in the Central and South America were connected to
the United States rather loosely, constituting “de facto” colonies.69 In the
latter case, no formal trade preferences were found in various bilateral trade
agreements between the United States and its de facto colonies that would
characterize those agreements as “sovereign-to-sovereign dealings.”70 Following the Second World War and the establishment of the Bretton Woods
architecture, the United States’ bilateral trade agreements having no general
tariff preferences, in particular one with Mexico in 1942, became the GATT
archetypes.71 Yet, other allied countries, such as England and France, were
eager to include those preferences in the initial GATT draft not only for the
economic well-being of the colonies, but also for their own reconstruction
needs.72 Realistically, it can be argued that the spirit of non-discriminatory,
free trade would better serve the economic interests of the United States at
its high time of dominance, just as England advocated free trade in its own
high time in the nineteenth century.73 Against this background, “parity of
obligation” came to prevail in GATT 1947, and no particular concern for
developing countries appeared in the early text save the “token exceptions,”
such as an infant-industry protection clause in Article XVIII.74 However,
these were seldom invoked.75
This parallel stance changed in the fifties, when former colonies rapidly
gained independence.76 Both parent states—in particular, England and
France—and former colonies were eager to establish a non-reciprocal, preferential system in GATT 1947, either through tariff preferences or more
drastic waivers.77 Moreover, the idea that developing countries required
special treatment began to gather steam within the GATT Secretariat and
68.
HUDEC, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 55, at 6.
69.
Id.
70.
Id.
71.
Id. at 7.
72.
Id. at 10.
73.
See Patrica Clavin, The Triumph of Regionalism Over Globalism: Patterns of Trade in the
Interwar Period, in REGIONAL TRADE BLOCS, MULTILATERALISM, AND THE GATT: COMPLEMENTARY
PATHS TO FREE TRADE 31, 32 (Till Geiger & Dennis Kennedy eds., 1996).
74.
Id. at 4. The United States viewed this clause as a major concession and refused to adopt any
other trade preferential system in the ITO draft. Id. at 14.
75.
LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 57, at 1169.
76.
BERNARD M. HOEKMAN & MICHEL M. KOSTECKI, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE WORLD
TRADING SYSTEM: THE WTO AND BEYOND 385-86 (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter THE WTO AND BEYOND];
HUDEC, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 55, at 23-24.
77.
THE WTO AND BEYOND, supra note 76, at 386.
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contracting parties.78 Thanks to this changed atmosphere, contracting parties
added Section B to Article XVIII in order to allow developing countries to
deviate from their GATT obligation for the balance-of-payment (BOP) reason.79 Although textually vague, Article XVIII was frequently invoked and
interpreted in a very lax fashion80—undermining the legal integrity of the
early GATT.
Advocates for international development gained more support when the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was
launched in 1964. UNCTAD eventually pushed the GATT contracting parties to accept the notion of “non-reciprocity,” which diverged sharply from
the premise of the tariff reduction mechanism under GATT, and to codify
this idea by adding Part IV on Trade and Development to the GATT text.81
Nonetheless, the real impact of Part IV has been questioned because of its
non-binding, hortatory nature.82 Another watershed in the history of development was the U.S. response to a call from UNCTAD to accept the Generalized System of Preferences (GSPs),83 which was nothing more than a nonreciprocal, unilateral mechanism of tariff preferences.84 Subsequent institutional efforts reinforced the GSP by acquiring a GATT waiver in 1971, and
78.
LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 57, at 1168.
79.
THE WTO AND BEYOND, supra note 76, at 386.
80.
Id.
81.
Id. at 387-88; see also Gerard Curzon & Victoria Curzon, GATT: Traders’ Club, in ROBERT W.
COX & HAROLD K. JACOBSON, THE ANATOMY OF INFLUENCE 298, 309 (1973); José E. Alvarez, The
WTO as Linkage Machine, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 146, 149 & n.17 (2002).
82.
LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 57, at 1171; MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE
REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 371 (2d ed. 1999) [hereinafter THE REGULATION OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE]. In a very rare case in the seventies, the GATT panel ruled that the EC’s failure
to join the developing countries in the International Sugar Agreement to stabilize world sugar prices
violated Part IV, in particular Article XXXVIII:1. However, the EC rejected this specific conclusion
thanks to the veto power under the old GATT dispute settlement mechanism. European Communities,
Refunds on Exports of Sugar, L/5011; GATT B.I.S.D. 27S/69-98 (Nov. 10, 1980), available at http://ww
w.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/gt47ds_e.htm. See also ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 474-76 (1993)
[hereinafter HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW].
83.
Under the Generalized System of Preferences, developed countries offer non-reciprocal preferential treatment, such as low or zero duties on imports to products originating in developing countries,
but developed countries (preference-giving countries) unilaterally determine the recipient (which countries) as well as the subject (which products) of the GSP schemes. See generally WTO, Development:
Main Legal Provisions, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/d2legl_e.htm (last visited Feb. 23,
2004). For instance, The U.S. GSP provides preferential duty-free entry for more than 4,650 products
from approximately 140 designated beneficiary countries and territories. U.S. Trade Representative, A
Guide to the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences, at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Development/
Preference_Programs/GSP/asset_upload_file333_5430.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2004). The U.S. GSP
program was instituted on January 1, 1976, and authorized under Title V of the Trade Act of 1974, 19
U.S.C. 2461 et seq. (2000), for a ten-year period, and the authorization has been renewed four times. Id.
(July 4, 1993, by the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984; July 31, 1995, by the Uruguay Round Agreement
Act; May 31, 1997, by the Small Business Act of 1996; and June 30, 1998, by the Budget and Reconciliation Act of 1997).
84.
Id.; THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 82, at 374-75. In contrast with the
GSP, the Global System of Trade Preferences (GSTP) was invented during the early seventies, under the
auspices of UNCTAD, as a system of tariff preferences negotiated and applied only among developing
countries. Id. at 378. The GSTP was initiated by UNCTAD’s aspiration to promote South-South trade
amid developed countries’ domination of North-South trade. Id.
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the Enabling Clause made the waiver permanent following the Tokyo
Round in 1979.85 In general, the Enabling Clause86 codified earlier principles and practices of development-related exemptions, such as the BOP
exception under GATT Article XVIII.87 This “de facto amendment” 88 of the
obligations under Article I established a general legal reference for nonreciprocal or special and differential treatment under GATT 1947. This series of developmental initiatives may be understood in a much broader political dimension—the context of the Cold War. Considering that GATT
1947 was operated and led by the anti-Communist (Western) bloc, it would
not be hard to imagine that those initiatives were, in certain respects, motivated by foreign affairs considerations against the Soviet (Eastern) bloc.89
It is still doubtful that the commitments and promises described thus far
have helped developing countries to improve their economic situation, to
escape from their chronic poverty, and to catch up with developed countries.
The most problematic feature of preferential developmental aid under
GATT 1947 (such as the GSP) can be found in its “unilateral, spasmodic”
nature.90 Development aid is essentially subject to the discretion of donor
countries, sometimes even under “paternalistic overtones.”91 Recipient
countries not only fail to raise their own concerns and demands but also are
forced to accept various conditions—often the adoption of certain labor
standards or cooperation with drug control—attached to such aid, despite
the fact that those conditions are often irrelevant to trade matters.92 Under
these circumstances, the political whim of donor countries, driven by the
political mood of domestic constituencies, tends to hamper the efficacy of
preferential development aid programs, as the total volume of these pro85.
THE WTO AND BEYOND, supra note 76, at 387.
86.
WTO Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, L/4903 (Nov. 28, 1979), http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/wto.gatt.developing.
countries.enabling.clause.1979/landscape.
87.
THE WTO AND BEYOND, supra note 76, at 388.
88.
HUDEC, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 55, at 85.
89.
Id. See generally MICHEL M. KOSTECKI, EAST-WEST TRADE AND THE GATT SYSTEM (1979).
90.
In fact, GSP benefits were limited to a small number of elite developing countries. See Frieder
Roessler, Domestic Policy Objectives and the Multilateral Trade Order: Lessons from the Past, 19 U.
PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 513, 519-20 (1998).
91.
MICHEL KOSTECKI, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE SERVICES IN TRADE-POLICY: A CONTRIBUTION TO
THE DISCUSSION ON CAPACITY-BUILDING IN THE WTO 6 (ICTSD Resource Paper No. 2, Nov. 2001)
[hereinafter TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE SERVICES], at http://www.ictsd.org/pubs/ictsd_series/resource_pap
ers/TApaper5-12-01.pdf.
92.
See Roessler, supra note 90, at 520; LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 57, at 1192-93; Balakrishnan
Rajagopal, From Resistance to Renewal: The Third World, Social Movements, and the Expansion of
International Institutions, 41 HARV. INT’L L.J. 529, 569-76 (2000) (regarding a similar condition imposed on developing countries when the IMF grants them structural adjustment loans). Cf. Charlotte
Denny, US Ties New Aid Package to Reform Targets, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, Mar. 23, 2002 (reporting
President Bush’s new “compact for development” linking aid to the poorest countries to the country’s
domestic reforms such as market opening and anti-corruption activities), available at http://www.guardia
n.co.uk/debt/Story/0,2763,672648,00.html. Recently, the WTO panel ruled against such conditioning.
See European Communities, Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences, WT/DS246/R (Dec. 1,
2003), available at 2003 WL 22873192; see also ÇAGLAR ÖZDEN & ERIC REINHARDT, THE PERVERSITY
OF PREFERENCES: GSP AND DEVELOPING COUNTRY TRADE POLICIES 1976-2000 (World Bank, Working
Paper No. 2955, 2003), available at http://econ.worldbank.org/files/23188_wps2955.pdf.
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grams decreases with the introduction of elements of irregularity.93 More
significantly, the unilateral, temporary nature of the abovementioned preferences, or “special and different treatment,” tended to induce a short-term
economic view on the part of developing countries. Both governments and
the private sector demonstrate rent-seeking behavior based on short-term
preferences, rather than pursuing longer-term structural reforms based on
the painful, yet rewarding, process of efficient resource allocation under a
classic model of international trade.94
Nonetheless, these adverse aspects of development assistance did not
justify other developmental strategies or initiatives that departed from the
original prescriptions of GATT 1947. For instance, “import-substitution
policies,”95 which were applied experimentally in the Latin America
economies, left behind enormous inefficiencies caused by high cost in local
production as well as the nurturing of local monopolies, and eventually
faded away in the sixties.96 Similarly, the New International Economic Order (NIEO),97 which reacted to “interventionist trade policies” and attempted to move trade forums from GATT to the United Nations, was a
failure. This resulted not only because it was built on “bad economics and
naïve politics” despite “well-intentioned legal theorizing,”98 but also be93.
The IMF expressed the same view on the shortcomings of preferential aid programs. In an
Issues Brief, it stated:
For a variety of reasons, preferential access schemes for poorer countries have not proven
very effective at increasing market access for these countries. Such schemes often exclude, or
provide less generous benefits for, the highly protected products of most interest to exporters
in the poorest countries. They are often complex, nontransparent, and subject to various exemptions and conditions (including noneconomic ones) that limit benefits or terminate them
once significant market access is achieved.
Global Trade Liberalization, supra note 17, at III; see also WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC
PROSPECTS 2004: REALIZING THE DEVELOPMENT PROMISE OF THE DOHA AGENDA 215 (2003) (highlighting that “[p]references have not increased the share of the least developed countries in imports into
the European Union and the United States”), available at http://www.worldbank.org/prospects/gep2004/
full.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2004).
94.
See J. Michael Finger & L. Alan Winters, What Can the WTO Do for Developing Countries?, in
THE WTO AS AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 365, 385 (Anne O. Krueger ed., 1998) [hereinafter
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION]. See also Jagdish N. Bhagwati, The Poor’s Best Hope: Trading for
Development, ECONOMIST, June 22, 2002 (highlighting the “perils of preferences” and urging the poor
nations to return to the basic tenet of free trade on a “non-preferential” basis), available at http://www.cf
r.org/pub4631/jagdish_n_bhagwati/the_poors_best_hope__trading_for_development.php.
95.
“Import substitution” refers to a strategy for economic “development from within” that emphasizes domestic production of basic consumer goods as a substitute for importation of those goods. JAMES
M. CYPHER & JAMES L. DIETZ, THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 174-75 (1997).
96.
THE WTO AND BEYOND, supra note 76, at 408. Although the import substitution strategy failed
to bring economic growth to developing countries, its rationale of “self-sufficiency” might be understandable considering the developing countries’ bitter experiences of exploitation in the colonial period.
Id. at 386. In the face of the demise of the import substitution policies, this rationale came to be reincarnated in the form of a “dependency theory” that attributes underdevelopment to “complicity between the
local power, elites and the forces of developed-country capitalism.” THE REGULATION OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 82, at 382.
97.
See generally LARS ANELL & BIRGITTA NYGREN, THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE
WORLD ECONOMIC ORDER (1980) (regarding a detailed background as well as a comprehensive analysis
of the NIEO).
98.
Robert E. Hudec, GATT Legal Restraints on the Use of Trade Measures Against Foreign Environmental Practices, in 2 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE?, 95,
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cause most developed countries withdrew their support when it became
apparent that the NIEO privileged sovereignty over international law, particularly in the area of expropriation.99
3. Reinventing the Gesellschaft?: Uruguay Round and the
Nascent “Capacity-Building”
By the late eighties, the contours of the global Gesellschaft had been
vastly transformed. An intensified move towards global market integration
led to much freer movement of goods, services, and capital. The fall of the
Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War offered a supportive context for a
higher level of material globalization, and developing countries became
eager to reap the benefits of participating in the global marketplace.100
Moreover, they had already learned that inward-looking developmental
strategies, such as import-substitution policies, fail to deliver solid economic growth.101 Developed countries also needed the support from developing countries to launch a new trade round that would address both old and
new issues. The result was a successful, new North-South bargain concluded in the Uruguay Round, which led to the establishment of the
WTO.102 As an essential part of this bargain, developing countries agreed to
the inclusion of new sectors under the WTO system, such as services and
intellectual property rights.103 This proactive, participatory approach on the
part of developing countries in the new global trade order seemed to match
an ambitious telos of the WTO, epitomized by an integrated, more viable
and durable multilateral trading system.104
With this transformation in the relationship between developed and developing countries, the nature of development assistance also began to
change. Apart from the past donor-recipient relationship,105 the new dynamic between developed and developing countries has elevated their relationship to the level of a partnership,106 through which the parties exercise
110 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996).
99.
LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 57, at 1194-96.
100.
See Alejandro Jara, Bargaining Strategies of Developing Countries in the Uruguay Round, in
THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN WORLD TRADE, supra note 18, at 27.
101.
THE WTO AND BEYOND, supra note 76, at 391-92.
102.
LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 57, at 1183.
103.
Id.
104.
See WTO Agreement, supra note 1, pmbl.
105.
Press Release, WTO, Speech by the Director General Mike Moore, National Conference on the
Millennium Round, Rome (Nov. 11, 1999) [hereinafter Rome Speech], available at http://www.wto.org/
english/news_e/pres99_e/pr146_e.htm.
106.
“Development, in the knowledge era, must mean partnerships based on sustainable systems of
innovation in both developed and developing nations for equity to be achieved.” Globalization: Neither
a Devil Nor a Panacea, OECD OBSERVER, June 27, 2000 (citing the statement by Baldwin Sipho
Ngubane, South African Minster for Art, Culture, Science and Technology), available at
http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory/php/aid/288. In the same context, J.M. Migai Akech detected the current shift in the U.S. development assistance policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa from aid
to trade, which can be dubbed a “neoclassical paradigm” in that this shift is based on the idea of creating
a “unified global economy” through further trade liberalization, in contrast with capitulations, which
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collective efforts in the pursuit of the aforementioned telos. Under these
circumstances, the focus of development assistance shifted from a shortterm, unilateral ground to a long-term, collective ground.107 Critically, development assistance came to emphasize the “capacity-building” of developing countries from their own standpoint, rather than from that of their
donors.108 Capacity-building requires an organized set of resources from
multiple sources109 and presupposes a well-surveyed “needs assessment,”110
to produce “tailored,” “demand-driven,”111 or “beneficiaries-oriented”112
assistance packages. According to Joseph Stiglitz, the degree of sensitivity
to the special needs of developing countries tends to determine the fairness
of trade relations between developed and developing countries.113
In various new side agreements under the WTO system, capacitybuilding programs of this kind are widely apparent. This reflects the realization that without such assistance developing countries would never be able
to “implement” new obligations flowing from those agreements,114 such as
the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS),115 the

tend to impose the Western policies and rules on non-Western developing countries. J.M. Migai Akech,
The African Growth and Opportunity Act: Implications for Kenya’s Trade and Development, 33 N.Y.U.
J. INT’L L. & POL. 651, 651-53 (2001).
107.
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE SERVICES, supra note 91, at 6.
108.
Press Release, WTO, General Council Special Session on Implementation: 22 June 2000 Organization of Work and Indicative Schedule of Meetings, available at www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres
00_e/pr184_e.htm; Press Release, WTO, Officials Examine How to Analyze Risk for Food Safety
Measures (June 20, 2000), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres00_e/pr183_e.htm; News
Items, WTO, WTO Highlights January–August 2000 [hereinafter WTO Highlights January–August
2000], available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news00_e/bknote_e.htm (last visited on Feb. 23,
2004); APEC, Statement of Chair, Meeting of APEC Ministers Responsible for Trade (Darwin, Australia, June 6-7, 2000), available at http://www.apecsec.org.sg/content/apec/ministerial_statements/se
ctoral_ministerial/trade/2000_trade.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2004). In a broad sense, this increasing
attention to each developing country’s capacity derives from the early failure of developmental prescription, which developed countries touted in the eighties. Based on the so-called “Washington consensus,”
policy recommendations from developed to developing countries chiefly focused on stringent fiscal and
monetary policies without due consideration of each developing country’s economic structure or “different response capacity,” producing very uneven results and thus rendering the “first-generation” reforms
unsatisfactory. MARGINALIZATION VERSUS PROSPERITY, supra note 66, at 4-6. Against this background,
the “second-generation” reforms in the nineties came to highlight the “right set of institutions.” Id. at 67.
109.
In this sense, the OECD views capacity building as synonymous with “networks across institutions and individuals, often across borders, to achieve common objectives.” OECD, Trade and Development in the New Global Context—The Capacity Dimension 4 (OECD Policy Brief, Sept. 2001) [hereinafter OECD Policy Brief], available at http://www.oecd.org/document/20/0,2340,en_2649_201185_18
99092_119696_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2004).
110.
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE SERVICES, supra note 91, at 15-16.
111.
Id. at 15.
112.
Id. at 6.
113.
Stiglitz, supra note 21, at 450.
114.
See Philippe Cullet, Differential Treatment in International Law: Towards a New Paradigm of
Inter-State Relations, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 549, 552 (1999) (defining “technology transfer” or “aid mechanisms” to foster the implementation of treaties by less developed countries as the application of “differential treatment”).
115.
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra
note 1, Annex 1A, RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND [hereinafter SPS Agreement], available at http://
wto.org/english/doc_e/legal_e/15-sps.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2004).
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Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), 116 and the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).117 For instance, the SPS Agreement offers certain patterns of technical assistance, such as “research and
infrastructure,” “establishment of national regulatory bodies,” and “technical expertise, training and equipment” to assist developing countries in
building the capacity to implement the Agreement.118 Similar assistance
programs are also found in the TBT Agreement and the GATS.119 These
new provisions triggered a four-fold increase in the actual demand for technical assistance by developing countries during the first five years after the
launch of the WTO.120 This phenomenon underscores the commitment to,
and struggle with, the implementation of new and burdensome obligations
on the part of developing countries. Markedly, the emphasis on capacity
building has also been found outside of the WTO realm. One example is the
recent regulatory rule-making treaty on “bio-safety.”121 Along these lines, a
116.
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 1,
Annex 1A, RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND [hereinafter TBT Agreement], available at http://www.w
to.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17-tbt.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2004).
117.
General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 1, Annex
1B, RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 33. I.L.M. 1167 (1994) [hereinafter GATS].
118.
SPS Agreement, supra note 115, art. 9.
119.
TBT Agreement, supra note 116, art. 11; see also WTO News: 2000 News Items, Developing
Countries Call for More Help in the Area of Technical Barriers to Trade (July 20, 2000), at www.wto.or
g/english/news_e/news00_e/wkpres_e.htm; WTO News: 2000 News Items, Workshop on Technical
Assistance and Special and Differential Treatment in the Context of the TBT Agreement (July 20, 2000),
at www.wto.org/english/news_e/news00_e/chairs_e.htm. Regarding the GATS, most developing countries want specific mechanisms for “effective implementation” or even “operationalisation” of Article
IV. WTO’s Draft Guidelines for Services Talks Strive for Inclusiveness, 3 BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS
DIG. 5 (Jan. 30, 2001), available at http://www.ictsd.org/html/weekly/story5.30-01-01.htm.
120.
See Challenges and Opportunities, supra note 23.
121.
See Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, Convention on Biological Diversity, arts. 20, 22, Jan. 29,
2000, available at http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/protocol.asp.
Article 20, paragraph 1 (A Biosafety Clearing-House)
A Biosafety Clearing-House is hereby established as part of the clearing-house mechanism
under Article 18, paragraph 3, of the Convention, in order to:
(a) Facilitate the exchange of scientific, technical, environmental and legal information
on, and experience with, living modified organisms; and
(b) Assist Parties to implement the Protocol, taking into account the special needs of developing country Parties, in particular the least developed and small island developing
States among them, and countries with economies in transition as well as countries that
are centres of origin and centres of genetic diversity.
Article 22 (Capacity Building)
1. The Parties shall cooperate in the development and/or strengthening of human resources
and institutional capacities in biosafety, including biotechnology to the extent that it is required for biosafety, for the purpose of the effective implementation of this Protocol, in developing country Parties, in particular the least developed and small island developing States
among them, and in Parties with economies in transition, including through existing global,
regional, subregional and national institutions and organizations and, as appropriate, through
facilitating private sector involvement.
2. For the purposes of implementing paragraph 1 above, in relation to cooperation, the needs
of developing country Parties, in particular the least developed and small island developing
States among them, for financial resources and access to and transfer of technology and
know-how in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, shall be taken fully
into account for capacity-building in biosafety. Cooperation in capacity-building shall, subject to the different situation, capabilities and requirements of each Party, include scientific
and technical training in the proper and safe management of biotechnology, and in the use of
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remarkable aspect of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety is its “countryspecificity” approach. Among other things, the Protocol emphasizes the
“special needs” of developing countries,122 and therefore seeks to “identify”
these needs before it launches any assistance program.123
Another critical aspect of development assistance is the maximization
of its effectiveness through the integration of discrete activities conducted
by different international organizations.124 Collaboration among the WTO,
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and other UN
agencies is regarded as crucial not only because it ensures the concentration
of scant resources, but also because it provides developing countries with
more coherent and focused assistance for capacity-building projects.125 For
instance, the World Bank assists developing countries to build human and
infrastructural capacity, while the WTO helps them to implement their legal
obligations.126 To execute this form of inter-institutional collaboration, representatives of the six core agencies (IMF, International Trade Center,
UNCTAD, United Nations Development Program, World Bank, and WTO)
formed the “Integrated Framework for Trade-Related Technical Assistance
to Least-Developed Countries (IF),”127 pledging to make the IF an effective
mechanism for capacity-building.128
In conclusion, the global Gesellschaft has begun to initiate development
programs centering on capacity-building as a result of a grand bargain between the rich and the poor in the Uruguay Round. Although the direction
of those programs is correct, mere initiation of programs never delivers acrisk assessment and risk management for biosafety, and the enhancement of technological
and institutional capacities in biosafety. The needs of Parties with economies in transition
shall also be taken fully into account for such capacity-building in biosafety.
Id. (emphasis added).
122.
Id. at art. 20.
123.
Decision V/1, Annex A (3), Convention on Biological Diversity, UNEP/CBD/BS/TE-BCH/1/IN
F/3 (Aug. 4, 2000), available at http://www.biodiv.org/doc/meetings/bch/tebch-01/information/tebch01-inf-03-en.pdf.
124.
The WTO is increasingly underbudgeted and understaffed in technical cooperation activities.
WTO Committee on Trade and Development, 27th Sess., WTO Programme for Technical Cooperation,
WT/COMTD/W/64 (Oct. 15, 1999).
125.
See generally WTO, Coherence: Closer Cooperation between Multilateral Institutions, at www.
wto.org/english/thewto_e/coher_e/coher_e.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2004); WTO Highlights January—
August 2000, supra note 108.
126.
To help developing countries to fulfill their legal obligations through implementation, legal
training and advice is critical. See Press Release, WTO, 14th WTO Trade Policy Course Comes to an
End (July 14, 2000), at www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres00_e/pr187_e.htm.
127.
See Integrated Framework, http://www.integratedframework.org/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2004).
128.
WTO News: 2000 News Items, Joint Statement on the Mandated Review of the Integrated
Framework for Trade-Related Technical Assistance to Least-Developed Countries (IF) by the Six Core
Agencies (IMF, ITC, UNCTAD, UNDP, World Bank and WTO) (July 6, 2000), at http:// www.wto.org/e
nglish/news_e/news00_e/ifstat_e.htm. This integrated pattern of efforts to help developing countries to
build capacity through technical assistance to implement trade-related regulatory treaties, such as the
TBT and the SPS, can also be found in a recent decision of the WTO General Council. The General
Council Decision on “Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns” urged international standard-setting
organizations to ensure participation of developing countries throughout all phases of development. See
WTO General Council, Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns, WT/L/384 (Dec. 19,
2000).
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tual results. As discussed below, these attempts have thus far borne little
fruit for a variety of reasons that derive mainly from the Gesellschaftian
structure of the current global trading system.
4. Reaffirming the Gesellschaftian Dilemma: The Futility of the
Doha Development Agenda
The fourth WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar was haunted by
two grave events: the debacle of the third Ministerial Conference in Seattle
and the September 11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington. These
two events pressured delegates from both rich and poor countries to strike a
deal to send the global village a strong signal. If the Doha Conference had
collapsed like the previous Seattle talks, it would have been a fatal blow to
the credibility of the global trading system. International commerce would
have been chilled and damaged, particularly in view of the U.S. recession,
which was compounded by the September 11th attacks. This desperate atmosphere contributed to the conclusion of a deal between developed and
developing countries, despite the failure of the Seattle meeting that left a
seemingly unbridgeable chasm between Southern and Northern agendas.129
In preparation for the Doha Conference, developed countries had revealed
their strong interests in new issues, such as investment and competition policy. Developing countries, on the other hand, remained fiercely opposed to
these ideas. They emphasized the importance of old issues, such as agriculture and textiles, in addition to other implementation-related challenges.130
This chasm was eventually bridged simply to save the meeting, which inevitably rendered the final Ministerial Declaration more rhetorical than substantial.
Markedly, the Doha Conference was labeled a “development round.”
Even before the Doha Conference, there existed a wide consensus in the
international society that any new trade initiative had to take into account
development issues, ranging from poverty eradication to secured access to
essential medicines. Not only the UN Secretary-General, but also the World
Bank President and the IMF Managing Director expressly advocated the
launch of a development round in Doha.131 In this respect, the Doha Minis129.
See Qatar Meeting to Take Place Despite Security Concerns, UN WIRE, Oct. 23, 2001, at
http://www.unwire.org/UNWire/20011023/20084_story.asp; Talks Extended; EU Withdraws Objections,
India May Follow, UN WIRE, Nov. 14, 2001, at http://www.unwire.org/UNWire/20011114/21720_story.
asp.
130.
Doha Ministerial: Six Key Issues in Search of a Solution, 1 BRIDGES DAILY UPDATE 1, Nov. 9,
2001, available at http://www.ictsd.org/ministerial/doha/wto_daily/englishissue1.htm.
131.
Annan Calls for “Development Round” of Trade Talks, UN WIRE, Sept.19, 2000, at http://www.
unwire.org/UNWire/20000919/10846_story.asp. World Bank President James Wolfensohn also warned
that “global poverty and the resulting social unrest threatens to destabilize developed countries” and that
“it is in their interest to bring about poverty alleviation in the developing world because we are one
world and, unless we get stability and growth in the developing world, we are not going to have a peaceful world.” Wolfensohn Promotes Equitable Growth, UN WIRE, Sept. 22, 2000, at http://www.unwire.or
g/UNWire/20000922/10924_story.asp; cf. Frederick M. Abbott, The Enduring Enigma of TRIPs: A
Challenge for the World Economic System, 1 J. INT’L ECON. L. 497 (1998) (arguing that the developed
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terial Declaration seems ambitious and promising. The rhetoric drew attention from the outset through language like “well targeted, substantially financed technical assistance and capacity-building programmes.”132 Straightforward usage of terms, such as “particular vulnerability” and “marginalization,” reflects the realization by the delegates of the seriousness of developmental concerns.133 Moreover, no new issue, such as investment and
competition policy, failed to be accompanied by some commitment to technical assistance.134 Nonetheless, it would be too early to celebrate the Doha
Declaration. Closer inspection reveals that the Declaration is rife with verbal commitments but lacks detailed and concrete action plans or programs
for development. No paragraph speaks of how to fund the ambitious technical assistance project. Furthermore, its legal nature as a “work program” is
still controversial, making it implausible to argue that it is formally binding.
In sum, it would be fair to say that the Doha Declaration amounts to more of
a blueprint for future development assistance than to an enforceable legal
document. It is unimaginable that the WTO dispute settlement mechanism
would ever be employed to enforce the work program under the Doha Declaration.
Frustratingly, current developments in the implementation of the Doha
round seem only to confirm this pessimistic view. The WTO Director General, Supachai Panitchpakdi, deplored disappointing trade figures for 2001
and early 2002,135 as well as the failure to agree on the urgent issue of access by the poor countries to essential medicines.136 Meanwhile, the new
U.S. farm bill introducing $180 billion in subsidies over the next decade,
and the EU’s failure to reform its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) initiated by a Franco-German collusion were “making a mockery of the idea
that the Doha round was to be a ‘development round.’”137
The fifth WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancún, Mexico in September
2003 was doomed by these gloomy post-Doha developments. The Cancún
conference collapsed amid an apparent lack of political will toward development. Many of the developed countries anticipated local elections. Addicountries’ emphasis on the static protection of intellectual property rights is misplaced and that this
“emphasis on maintaining technological advantage is a ‘beggar thy neighbor’ approach” incompatible
with an integrating world economy).
132.
WTO, Ministerial Declaration: The Fourth WTO Ministerial Meeting (Doha, Qatar),
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, para. 2 (adopted Nov. 14, 2001) [hereinafter Doha Declaration]. See also id. at
paras. 38-41.
133.
Id. at para. 3. But cf. Philip C. Aka, Africa in the New World Order: The Trouble with the Notion
of African Marginalization, 9 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 187 (2001) (arguing that the concept of marginalization is troubling because it “depicts Africa as sui generis, when most of the problems Africans face
are global features of underdevelopment common to the developing world as a whole”).
134.
Doha Declaration, supra note 132, at paras. 20-21, 23-24.
135.
WTO Says Slowdown Underscores Need for Progress on Doha, UN WIRE, Oct. 11, 2002, at http
://www.unwire.org/UNWire/20021011/29596_story.asp.
136.
Press Release, WTO, Supachai Disappointed over Governments’ Failure to Agree on Health and
Development Issues (Dec. 20, 2002), at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres02_e/pr329_e.htm.
137.
Finance and Economics: Trading Insults; The Zoellick Plan, ECONOMIST, Nov. 30, 2002, at 81;
see also Leaders: Coming Unstuck; World Trade, ECONOMIST, Nov. 2, 2002, at 14.
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tionally, an alliance of unprecedented intransigence existed among the most
influential developing countries. Most of all, developing countries demanded that agricultural subsidies be scrapped so that they could earn hard
currencies from the export of their agricultural products—the only way for
many of them to escape poverty. Yet, developed countries countered this
demand with a demand of their own—the incorporation of an investment
agenda into the WTO—despite the fact that the establishment of such a basic tenet of free trade should not require a quid pro quo. The several days of
negotiation were simply too short a period of time to bridge their divergent
stances. Hence, the call of the Doha Development Agenda was left unanswered and the global Gesellschaft remains flawed.
III. SCRUTINIZING THE FLAWED ENTERPRISE OF GLOBAL
GESELLSCHAFT: WHY AND HOW IT FAILED
A. The Main Failure: Persistent Protectionism
Although the origin of the global Gesellschaft (GATT 1947), is found in
the painful historical lesson of the global economic balkanization that eventually contributed to World War II,138 old habits die hard. Political realities
have demonstrated recidivistic patterns of protectionism. Accordingly, the
global Gesellschaft operates in a schizophrenic manner where the official
axiom of the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce coexists with an anathematic protectionist phenomenon. It seems that
GATT’s proverbial Odysseus tied his hands loosely enough to steer his
course toward the Sirens of protectionism.
Indeed, the very architecture of the global Gesellschaft is defenseless to
mercantilism because trade negotiations are premised on the principle of
reciprocity or quid pro quo. These negotiations produce a reciprocal exchange of concessions, based on a general assumption that exportation is
good and importation is bad from the standpoint of creating national
wealth.139 Simply put, the extent of market access to one country tends to
depend on that to the other. This reciprocity certainly goes against an underlying theoretical proposition of free trade mandating even unilateral, voluntary trade liberalization for the liberalizing country’s own benefit.140 Understandably, yet still problematically, such a mantra does not appeal to politicians who usually respond, and often pander, to their own domestic constituencies under short-term election cycles.141 Frustratingly, even some
138.
Catastrophically, major economies in the inter-war period responded to the global depression by
a mutually destructive spiral of protectionism. GLOBALIZATION, GROWTH, AND POVERTY, supra note 16,
at 26-27. The U.S. opened the salvo by passing the notorious Smoot-Hawley Act in 1930, which caused
a chain reaction of retaliation abroad. Id. at 27; see also GREIDER, supra note 9, at 43.
139.
HUDEC, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 55, at 17.
140.
See JAGDISH BHAGWATI, PROTECTIONISM 24-33 (1988) (discussing the “Intellectual Case for
Unilateral Free Trade”).
141.
See G. Edward Schuh, Developing Country Interests in WTO Agricultural Policy, in POLITICAL
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intellectuals defend this distorted version of trade, which Paul Krugman
aptly termed “pop internationalism.”142
This reciprocal approach is particularly painful to poor countries who
cannot bargain with rich countries on equal footing. For example, developed
countries refuse to bargain over certain products that are being produced by
developing countries under a comparative advantage, but which developed
countries are nonetheless eager to protect for political reasons. These products include textiles and clothing,143 agricultural products,144 and other
commodities produced through labor-intensive manufacturing processes.145
As a result, the tariffs on certain basic products in developed countries, despite several rounds of tariff reduction, are still higher—greater than fifteen
percent—than on manufactured goods. This phenomenon is defined as a
“tariff peak.”146 In the case of agricultural products, the tariff peak is so severe that the average tariff for agricultural protection in developed countries
is almost nine times higher than for manufacturing.147 In addition, tariff
ECONOMY, supra note 44, at 446-47 (observing that protection breeds more protection because the
benefits of protection are “soon capitalized into the structure of costs and thus seem to disappear and in
turn to give rise to more pleas for additional protectionism”).
142.
See generally PAUL KRUGMAN, POP INTERNATIONALISM (1996). Krugman trenchantly exposed
several common misleading clichés of pop internationalism and illuminated why they were wrong. Paul
R. Krugman, What Do Undergrads Need To Know About Trade?, Address Before the American Economic Association (Jan. 5-7, 1993), in AM. ECON. REV., May 1993, at 23-26.
143.
Cf. Michael Kitchen, Meetings Focus on Reform, Millennium Goals, UN WIRE, Sept. 30, 2002
[hereinafter UN WIRE (Stern)] (citing World Bank Chief Economist Nicholas Stern who argued that “for
every textile job saved in an industrialized country through the use of tariff barriers, 35 textile jobs are
lost in low-income nations”), at http://www.unwire.org/UNWire/20020930/29272_story.asp.
144.
UNCTAD TDR 2002, supra note 17, at 35.
While tariffs on many traditional primary commodities and agricultural raw materials are either zero or
minimal in developed country markets, a number of “sensitive” products such as sugar, cocoa, rice and
tobacco continue to face high barriers, and tariff escalation impedes diversification efforts. Subsidies to
farmers in the member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) further limit export opportunities to developing country producers.
Id.; see also Kym Anderson, Bringing Discipline to Agricultural Policy Via the WTO, in A PRO-ACTIVE
AGENDA, supra note 20, at 26-28.
145.
Developing countries resented the developed countries’ encroachment into the developing
countries’ comparative advantage. In one display of this frustration, Uruguay sued 15 developed countries before a GATT panel in the early sixties for their protectionist trade restrictions, such as the EC
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Though the panel refused to rule on some sensitive legal issues, it
did recommend that all violations admitted or self-confessed by the defendants be settled or removed by
March 1, 1963. Report of the Panel on Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII, Nov. 15, 1962, GATT
B.I.S.D. 11S/95 (1963). See also HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 82, at
445-47.
146.
WTO, Understanding the WTO: Developing Countries, at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e
/whatis_e/tif_e/dev4_e.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2004); Global Trade Liberalization, supra note 17, at
III. For instance, the U.S. has tariff peaks on about three hundred individual products, while its average
tariff is only five percent. Id.
147.
Global Trade Liberalization, supra note 17, at III. To make matters worse, agricultural subsidies
in developed countries, which amount to two thirds of Africa’s total GDP, also undermine developing
countries’ exports and development. Id. See also Hans Binswanger & Ernst Lutz, Agricultural Trade
Barriers, Trade Negotiations, and the Interests of Developing Countries (2000) (arguing that developed
countries’ export subsidies in agriculture should be removed; domestic producer subsidies and bound
tariffs should be reduced; access under tariff quotas should be increased; and tariff escalation on processed agricultural products should be terminated), available at http://www.unctad-10.org/pdfs/ux_tdxrt1
d8.en.pdf.
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protection of manufactured goods in developed countries tends to increase
in proportion to the sophistication of the manufacturing process.148 This
“tariff escalation” discourages developing countries from diversifying or
upgrading their exports to “higher value-added products.”149 Undoubtedly,
these protectionist phenomena impede and undermine the economic development of developing countries.150
In addition to tariff protection, developed countries have responded to
fierce lobbying by domestic competitors and have systematically blocked
the import of “low-skill, labor-intensive goods.”151 When such goods are
uncomfortably successful in the developed countries’ markets, the respective governments have not hesitated to circumvent or even override the
GATT obligations, invoking for example Voluntary Export Restraints
(VERs), which are concluded in a less-than-voluntary manner.152 One of the
most notorious VERs is the Multifiber Arrangement (MFA),153 which re148.
Global Trade Liberalization, supra note 17, at III.
149.
Id.
150.
The Monterrey Consensus, which is the result of the recent International Conference on Financing for Development held in Mexico in March 2002, provided a panoply of areas in which developing
countries suffer from the protectionist trade policies of developed countries. The Consensus stated:
We acknowledge the issues of particular concern to developing countries and countries with
economies in transition in international trade to enhance their capacity to finance their development, including trade barriers, trade-distorting subsidies and other trade-distorting measures, particularly in sectors of special export interest to developing countries, including agriculture; the abuse of anti-dumping measures; technical barriers and sanitary and phytosanitary measures; trade liberalization in labour intensive manufacturers; trade liberalization in
agricultural products; trade in services; tariff peaks, high tariffs and tariff escalation, as well
as non-tariff barriers; the movement of natural persons . . . .
U.N. International Conference on Financing for Development, Adoption of the Monterey Consensus,
A/Conf/198/3 (2002), available at http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/aconf198-3.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2004).
See also African Finance Ministers Call for Rich Countries to Open Markets, UN WIRE, Aug. 1, 2002,
at http://www.unwire.org/UNWire/20020801/28049_story.asp (last visited Feb. 23, 2004). Interestingly,
the Oxfam International, an NGO, invented a Double Standards Index (DSI) in order to “quantify the
gap” between free trade principles promoted by developed countries and their “actual protectionist
policies.” Oxfam Report Highlights Hypocrisies in Global Trading System, 6 BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE
NEWS DIG. 14 (2002), available at http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/02-04-16/story4.htm (last visited Feb.
23, 2004).
151.
WORLD TRADE AND PAYMENTS, supra note 54, at 299; see also Gerald K. Helleiner, The New
Industrial Protectionism and the Developing Countries, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THIRD WORLD
DEVELOPMENT (Pradip K. Ghosh ed., 1984) (criticizing developed countries’ “new protectionism” in
specific labor-intensive sectors in which developing countries retain a definite comparative advantage as
beyond a general “economic nationalism”). This systematic protection against developing countries’
exports can be found not only in multilateral but also in regional trade relations. Cf. BELA BALASSA,
THE NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZING COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 118-19 (1981) (discussing “international cartels” and “market-sharing” in some industries, including textiles and shoes, resulting from
new protectionist moves by developed countries which feared competition from developing countries).
See generally Stephany Griffith-Jones, Economic Integration in Europe: Implications for Developing
Countries, in THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN WORLD TRADE, supra note 18, at 33-49.
152.
Hugh Corbet, Preface to HUDEC, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 55, at xiv.
153.
The MFA is an agreement between nine importing developed country parties and 31 exporting
developing countries which limits the exportation of textiles and clothing through various instruments,
such as Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs) and quotas. THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE,
supra note 82, at 310. For an economic analysis on the impact of the MFA, see Yongzheng Yang, The
Impact of MFA Phasing Out on World Clothing and Textile Markets, 30 J. DEV. STUD. 892, 908-09
(1994). Yang concluded that the MFA’s “dampening effect” on trade was substantial, though its effect
on global production and consumption was small. Id. Yang also suggested that the MFA be eliminated as
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stricted nearly eighty percent of U.S. potential imports in textile and apparel
from the LDCs in the early eighties.154 Likewise, even in the unilateral reduction of tariffs for developing countries, as seen in the GSP, donor (developed) countries deliberately excluded from the system those products
which competed with similar domestic products but tended to be produced
in poor countries because of their labor-intensive nature.155 Surprisingly, on
average less than thirty percent of all dutiable imports from developing
countries actually benefit from GSP programs.156
This persistent trend towards protectionism by rich countries is particularly problematic if one considers that the notion of comparative advantage
is dynamic. That is to say, as a country’s general economic situation improves, that country’s comparative advantage tends to shift away from labor-intensive sectors to more capital or technology-intensive ones.157 This
transformation of comparative advantage has been demonstrated by developments in East Asian countries, such as Korea and Taiwan, in the 1970s
and 1980s,158 and by more dramatic performances on the part of new globalizers, such as China, India, and Mexico, in the 1990s.159 Nonetheless, significant protectionism on the part of developed countries continues to prevent other developing countries from capitalizing on their comparative advantages and from reaching higher levels of economic development. As a

quickly as possible because the liberalization of the MFA would mean a “Pareto improvement” for all
participants. Id. at 89. Regarding the political economic aspects of textiles trade, see generally VINOD K.
AGGARWAL, LIBERAL PROTECTIONISM: THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF ORGANIZED TEXTILE TRADE
(1985); and CARL B. HAMILTON, TEXTILES TRADE AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: ELIMINATING
THE MULTI-FIBRE ARRANGEMENT IN THE 1990S (1990).
154.
WORLD TRADE AND PAYMENTS, supra note 54, at 299.
155.
Id. at 300. Section 503(c)(2) of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2463(c)(2) (2001),
articulates the “competitive need test” by which any GSP beneficiary may lose its status when it is
deemed to enjoy sufficient competitiveness in the U.S. market. LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 57, at
1192. Though its main purpose is to benefit other not-so-competitive countries, it can be abused to
benefit domestic industries that produce competitive products. In addition, this exclusionary practice not
only undermines the actual effect of preferential aid programs, such as GSPs, but also is a disservice to
economic justice. Frank J. Garcia, Trade and Inequality: Economic Justice and the Developing World,
21 MICH. J. INT’L L. 975, 1033-35 (2000).
156.
See INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 94, at 385.
157.
According to the Hecksher-Ohlin theorem, which is basically grounded on the Ricardian model,
countries will export products which use the factor of production which abounds and thus is relatively
cheap. See JAN S. HOGENDORN & WILSON B. BROWN, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 229-30
(1979).
158.
WORLD TRADE AND PAYMENTS, supra note 54, at 171-72. However, some observers make
reservations on the “sustainability and generalizability” of the East Asian experience. See THE
REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 82, at 394. Some may even contend that the East
Asian economies have been so successful not because of classical trade liberalization, but because of
proper protectionism or managed trade. Cf. Trade, Civil Society Decision-Makers Convene at WTO
Symposium, 6 BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG. 16 (2002), available at http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/0
2-05-02/story1.htm. After all, the speed, sequence and modalities of trade liberalization (which should
be applied on a case-by-case basis), as well as the socio-cultural characteristics, are determinative of the
success of trade policies. This may be why the East Asian examples are often hard to generalize as
development prescriptions.
159.
GLOBALIZATION, GROWTH, AND POVERTY, supra note 16, at 8.
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result, many developing countries remain trapped in their initial stage of
development.160
Admittedly, certain developing countries have only themselves to blame
for limitations on market access to developed countries. Originally, developing countries had been persuaded by developed countries to tolerate the
latter’s trade barriers over basic goods, such as agricultural products or textiles, in exchange for GATT exemptions. This enabled developing countries
to pursue their own models of developmental strategies outside the legal
terrain of GATT, such as import-substitution policies. However, this “Faustian bargain” 161 turned out to be disastrous to most developing countries that
accepted it, because the cost incurred by the limited market access had become too high.162 Moreover, the putative benefit of developmental strategies
that remained outside of GATT proved to be a mirage.163 Instead, those
strategies, as seen in the case of import-substitution policies, generated
counter-productive effects, in that special interest groups began to form
within developing countries at the expense of general, structural reforms.164
Nonetheless, in the case of transition economies, developed countries
seem to be more vulnerable to criticism than in the aforementioned case of
the Faustian bargain. In fact, those economies, mostly concentrated in Eastern and Central Europe, were in an advantageous position to pursue liberal,
free trade policies, since no prominent vested interests prevailed after the
centrally planned economies collapsed.165 However, as soon as these transition economies restructured their domestic laws and procedures towards the
open market system, they discovered that rich countries, who untiringly
preached the value of free trade to them, actually maintained heavy trade
160.
See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY BANK & WORLD BANK, MARKET ACCESS FOR DEVELOPING
COUNTRY EXPORTS—SELECTED ISSUES 14 (2002) (observing that “[t]he pattern of protection creates
particular hurdles for countries taking the first steps up the technology ladder”), at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/ma/2002/eng/092602.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2004).
161.
THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 82, at 368 (quoting Sidney Weintraub
who argued that developing countries received special and differential treatment which freed them from
the legal disciplines of GATT in return for allowing their most competitive export products to be excluded from trade preferences).
162.
Corbet, supra note 151, at xiv; see also Murray Gibbs, Special and Differential Treatment in the
Context of Globalization (Paper Presented in the G15 Symposium on Special and Differential Treatment
in the WTO Agreements in New Delhi, Dec. 10, 1998) (listing a variety of increasingly negative discrimination by developed countries, such as VERs, anti-dumping duties, and MFAs, which eventually
outweighed positive discrimination under special and differential treatment), available at http://www.wt
o.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/sem01_e/gibbs_e.doc. In the same context, WTO Director General Moore
noted that potential benefits from special and differential (S&D) treatments for developing countries
might have been outweighed by exemptions that had in practice favored developed countries: something
that may be called “reverse S&D.” Ablasse Ouedraogo, Seminar on Special and Differential Treatment
for Developing Countries, Closing Remarks (July 30, 2000), at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/se
m01_e/sdtrem_e.htm.
163.
THE WTO AND BEYOND, supra note 76, at 408.
164.
See WTO Committee on Trade and Development, 28th Sess., Note on the Meeting of March 10,
2000, WT/COMTD/M/28/Add.1 (Aug. 2, 2000), available at http;//docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/
t/WT/COMTD/M28A1.doc.
165.
Jaroslaw Pietras, The Role of the WTO for Economies in Transition, in INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION, supra note 94, at 359.
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barriers against their exports, such as agricultural products or clothing.166
This not only frustrated the new governments but also compelled them to
imitate protectionist trade policies pursued by wealthy nations, thus raising
new trade barriers.167 In other situations, EU member states even pressed
transition economies to follow elements of the EU’s own pre-existing protectionist trade regime, such as the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), as a
condition on their objective to “rejoin Europe.”168 Accession to the EU, of
course, is one of the highest political priorities of many transition economies, which made it difficult to reject such conditionality.169 Frustratingly,
this forced spiral of protectionist dynamics, through the expansion of the
CAP, is a serious impediment to the economic development of non-member
developing countries whose major exports are agricultural products.
Finally, the anti-dumping (AD) system merits some discussion with respect to its protectionist nature and adverse effect on development.170 The
low price of foreign imports is often associated with the theory of comparative advantage since cheap products usually result from cheap factors of
production, such as labor. The anti-competitive rationale of the AD system,
that is, “predatory pricing,” is unpersuasive because cheap imports from the
poor do not, and cannot, drive big companies out of their markets. Therefore, AD rules lack all economic justification.171 Nonetheless, the AD system, as a contingent protectionist instrument, is widely used to curb the flow
of cheap imports into domestic markets and thus continuously hinders developing countries producing these products.172 The actual and potential
damage the AD system inflicts on developing countries is illustrated by the
fact that the usual suspects alleged to be dumping are developing countries
with insufficient market power to exclude competitors, while their accusers
tend to be developed countries.173 In particular, some developing countries
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 360.
Id.
UNCTAD TDR 2002, supra note 17, at 36.
Despite efforts to tighten the rules on the application of anti-dumping procedures and measures, such measures can be relatively easily applied, and they have become a preferred tool of
protection used by many developed countries and an increasing number of developing countries. Even if duties are finally not imposed, such procedures often have a dampening effect
on trade, prompting importers to seek alternative sources of supply. Moreover, responding to
an investigation can create a huge burden for affected countries.

Id.
171.
GLOBALIZATION, GROWTH, AND POVERTY, supra note 16, at 61.
172.
In the Tokyo Round Anti-Dumping Code, Article 13 included a special consideration for developing countries in the form of “constructive remedies” to mitigate any devastating impact that AD
measures might cause them. THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 82, at 372. However, this general provision failed to be effectively implemented in the developed countries’ domestic
legal systems. Id.
173.
GLOBALIZATION, GROWTH, AND POVERTY, supra note 16, at 61 (observing that developing
countries bear a disproportionate burden of AD measures in both rich-country markets and other developing countries vis-à-vis developed countries); see also ARVIND PANAGARIYA, THE MILLENNIUM
ROUND AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: NEGOTIATING STRATEGIES AND AREAS OF BENEFITS 24 (2000);
The Dumping Dilemma; Rising Protectionism, ECONOMIST, June 1, 2002, at 91.
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are haunted by the possible surge of AD measures by developed countries in
the textiles and clothing sector when MFA-related quotas are eventually
phased out under the WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing.174
The perils of AD rules do not stop there. In stark contrast with their
anti-competitive, market-protecting rationale, AD rules create anticompetitive situations such as “cartelization.”175 Through prosecuting low
prices, AD rules produce the same effect of fixing prices.176 Moreover, even
a threat of AD suits discourages new producers from attempting to enter the
market.177 As Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan trenchantly
observed, AD rules are “just simple guises for inhibiting competition,” despite their hypocritical disguise in the name of “fair trade.”178 What is more
demoralizing is the AD rules’ contagion effect or negative learning effect.
Developing countries have now begun to imitate the developed countries’
penchant for AD suits for their own protectionist purposes under the subterfuge of a defensive attack.
In sum, along with the Faustian Bargain discussed above, the AD rules
tend to convert the poor from victims to accomplices in distorting and corrupting the global Gesellschaft’s original goal of promoting free trade.
B. The New Complication: Regulatory Unilateralism
The global Gesellschaft in its original form was mainly designed to
tackle traditional trade barriers, such as tariffs and quotas. Recently, however, developed country governments, under the banner of the welfare state,
have been pressured to respond to ever-growing regulatory demands on
various issues of social hygiene, such as human health, public safety, and
environmental protection. No matter how legitimate these domestic regulations may be, they often constitute a new form of trade barrier—Non-Tariff
Barriers (NTBs). For example, the proliferation of domestic regulations in
the rich nations affects poor nations most painfully when they are denied
market access because their exports fail to conform to high and costly regulatory standards imposed by the rich nations.
China, for instance, increasingly uses asbestos, not only in the constructionsector but also in manufacturing, despite known health risks.179 Some
developed countries, including those of the EU, strictly ban any use, mar-

174.
Vangelis Vitalis, The Development Impact of Developed-World Policies on Developing Countries: The Case of Trade (Paper Presented at the Global Development Technical Workshop, Cairo,
Egypt, Jan. 16-17, 2003), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/17/1680402.pdf.
175.
Richard J. Pierce Jr., Antidumping Law as a Means of Facilitating Cartelization, 67 ANTITRUST
L.J. 725, 739 (2000).
176.
Id.
177.
Id. at 740.
178.
Id. at 725.
179.
In Brief, BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG. (International Centre for Trade and Sustainable
Development, Geneva), Oct. 19, 1998, available at http://www.newsbulletin.org/getbulletin.cfm?bulletin
_ID=14&issue_ID=1165&browse=1&SID=#In%20Brief.
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keting, or importation of asbestos and asbestos-based products.180 However,
as a developing country, China cannot afford to switch to costly asbestos
substitutes and thus loses access to foreign markets. Another example of the
developmentally fatal effects of regulatory unilateralism can be found in the
recent debate on genetically modified foods. Confronting widespread poverty, as well as a grim Malthusian scenario,181 GM technology may revolutionize the current farming process and contribute greatly to increased food
production.182 Yet, some developed countries, including EU countries,
strongly oppose GM foods from a regulatory or socio-cultural perspective.183 Regardless of the legitimacy of these highly precautionary policies,
they deter the economic development of poor countries desiring to use this
technology to boost their exports. Tönnies would have found another Gesellschaftian trait in these examples: the rich forcing the poor to conform to
high standards set by the rich.184
In sum, regulatory unilateralism puts the global Gesellschaft in a dilemma. On the one hand, a failure to respond to contemporary regulatory
demand would result in political backlash within developed countries, ultimately diminishing its legitimacy. In this regard, many critics, including
many NGOs, fear that a pro-trade ethos embedded in the global Gesellschaft
is likely to lead states to introduce competitive strategies based on an efficiency-driven philosophy, which is “dysfunctional or at best disruptive,”185
and will eventually engage them in a regulatory “race to the bottom.”186
180.
See, e.g., Appellate Body and Panel Report, Measures Affecting the Prohibition of Asbestos and
Asbestos Products, as amended, WT/DS135 (Apr. 5, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop
_e/dispu_e/distab_e.htm.
181.
It is estimated that an additional two billion people will be born within the next thirty years,
which necessitates that the human race double the current level of food production. WTO, Mike Moore,
Prospects for the Developing Countries for the Next Round, Address to the Development Committee of
the European Parliament (Feb. 21, 2000), at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spmm_e/spmm25_e.ht
m.
182.
New Report Cites Importance of Technology to Poor States, UN WIRE, July 9, 2001, at http://w
ww.unwire.org/unwire/20010709/15881_story.asp.
183.
EU Rules in Dispute; Trade War Brewing?, UN WIRE, June 16, 1999, at http://www.uwire.org/u
nwire/19990616/3219_story.asp.
184.
THE CLASSIC STATEMENTS, supra note 6.
185.
William W. Bratton et al., Introduction: Regulatory Competition and Institutional Evolution, in
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY COMPETITION AND COORDINATION: PERSPECTIVES ON ECONOMIC
REGULATION IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 1, 3 (William W. Bratton et al. eds., 1996).
186.
However, many economists reject this notion. See, e.g., John Douglas Wilson, Capital Mobility
and Environmental Standards: Is There a Theoretical Basis for a Race to the Bottom?, in FAIR TRADE
AND HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE? ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 393, 423 (Jagdish
Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996) [hereinafter FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION I] (observing
that a “race” is not an accurate description of the behaviors of independent governments, and that this
race model fails to explain the absence of more direct means to attract foreign firms, such as subsidies or
a lower tax rate on capital gains); Arik Levinson, Environmental Regulations and Industry Location:
International and Domestic Evidence, in FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION I, supra, at 429, 453 (emphasizing the lack of economic evidence to support such a claim). In contrast, many others recognize the
opposite phenomenon of “race to the top.” See, e.g., Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International
Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1,
61 (2002); Patrick B. Griffin, The Delaware Effect: Keeping the Tiger in Its Cage: The European Experience of Mutual Recognition in Financial Services, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 337, 340 (2001); ADRIENNE
HÉRITIER ET AL., RINGING THE CHANGES IN EUROPE: REGULATORY COMPETITION AND THE

File: TheWTO'sGemeinschaft

516

Created on: 5/31/2007 9:32:00 AM

Alabama Law Review

Last Printed: 6/11/2007 10:58:00 AM

[Vol. 56:2:483

On the other hand, if developed countries were to saddle developing
countries with the former’s high standards without due regard for the latter’s
incapability, developing countries’ access to developed countries’ markets
would be severely damaged, thwarting the developing countries’ economic
growth and their integration into the global market.187 The bottom line is
that, due to their limited financial and technical capacity, most developing
countries—and particularly the least-developed countries—cannot afford to
comply with the demanding and sophisticated regulations enacted by developed countries.188 Under these circumstances, forced compliance tends to
TRANSFORMATION OF THE STATE: BRITAIN, FRANCE, GERMANY 1 (1996).
187.
See Jim Rollo & L. Alan Winters, Subsidiarity and Governance Challenges for the WTO: Environmental and Labour Standards, in A PRO-ACTIVE AGENDA, supra note 20, at 185, 186 (observing that
enforcing labor and environmental standards through trade sanctions will result not only in the maladministration of these standards, but also in the loss of traditional economic benefits through the trade
liberalization flowing from GATT); Robert M. Stern, Labor Standards and Trade, in NEW DIRECTIONS
IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JOHN H. JACKSON 425, 437 (Marco
Bronckers & Reinhard Quick eds., 2000) (arguing that “the surest way to achieve higher labor standards”
in poor countries is for rich countries to open their markets and encourage the economic development of
poor countries); THIRD WORLD NETWORK, UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME,
MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM: A DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVE 15 (2001) (arguing that trade-related
issues such as health and the environment should be dealt with not by the WTO but by relevant specialized international organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nation
Environmental Program (UNEP), respectively), available at http://www.undp.org/mainundp/propoor/do
cs/multitradesystem.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2004); Roessler, supra note 90, at 514 (arguing that the
integration of certain regulatory subject matters, such as labor and environment, into the multilateral
trade order undermined both trade and non-trade objectives); Jose E. Alvarez, How Not to Link: Institutional Conundrums of an Expanded Trade Regime, 7 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 1, 4-15 (2001) (criticizing an
effort to link “human rights obligations” to trade disciplines); Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The WTO in Transition:
Of Constituents, Competence and Coherence, 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 979, 1009 (2001) (discovering the conceptual as well as practical difficulties of incorporating “national interest” (non-WTO law)
and “comparative advantage” (WTO law), considering the fundamentally different and conflicting assumptions of the two); Gregory Shaffer, WTO Blue-Green Blues: The Impact of U.S. Domestic Politics
on Trade-Labor, Trade-Environment Linkages for the WTO’s Future, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 608, 64748 (2000) (observing that any linkage effort by developed countries would be futile without significant
financial assistance to developing countries to help them implement certain regulatory obligations demanded by the developed countries); Hal S. Shapiro, A New Liberal Trade Policy Foundation, 9 ILSA J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 431, 432-33 (2003) (arguing that, in the interest of developing countries, liberals
should stop promoting “linkages” between trade and other social issues such as labor and the environment, and instead advocate freer trade, with separate U.S. government initiatives (“carrots” rather than
“sticks”) to promote development in developing countries); Laurent A. Ruessmann, Putting the Precautionary Principle in Its Place: Parameters for the Proper Application of a Precautionary Approach and
the Implications for Developing Countries in Light of the Doha WTO Ministerial, 17 AM. U. INT’L L.
REV. 905, 938-39 (2002) (submitting that the EC’s effort to strengthen a “precautionary principle” in
WTO law is misguided and would be prejudicial to the interests of developing countries). But cf. James
Thuo Gathii, Re-Characterizing the Social in the Constitutionlization of the WTO: A Preliminary Analysis, 7-SPG WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 137, 138 (2001) (arguing that “social issues should be reconceptualized to reflect the proper theoretical premise of the actual reality of the international trading
regime”).
188.
See Spencer Henson et al., The Impact of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures on Developing
Country Exports of Agricultural and Food Products (Paper Presented at the Conference on Agriculture
and the New Trade Agenda in the WTO 2000 Negotiations, Geneva, Switzerland, Oct. 1-2, 1999) (exploring the impact of the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures on developing
countries’ exports of agricultural and food products into the developed countries’ markets), available at
http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/ESSD/essdext.nsf/12DocByUnid/58DFE7F9DFBBE1615256C85006EF3
43/$FILE/henson_et%%0.pdf; John S. Wilson, Standards, Regulation, and Trade: WTO Rules and
Developing Country Concerns, in HANDBOOK, supra note 27, at 428, 437 (pointing to a “common constraint” that developing countries face, the “[l]ack of modern technical infrastructure and capacity to
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offset any comparative advantage that developing countries naturally retain
vis-à-vis developed countries. Furthermore, regulatory unilateralism is easily abused and breeds camouflaged forms of protection, as manifested by
“green” (environmental regulation-driven) or “blue” (labor regulationdriven) protectionism.189
Yet this problem cannot be effectively tackled through the traditional
approach to development that focuses mainly on preferential tariffs, such as
GSPs. The root of the problem is inextricably linked to a far more profound
premise, namely the tension between regulatory autonomy in developed
countries and trade concerns in developing countries. This tension transforms the contours of development in international trade and compels us to
seek a new paradigm. The new paradigm is different from the current Gesellschaftian model centered on such premises as negotiation, bargain, and
contract. Even rich countries should include poor countries’ circumstances
in their policy equations as relevant parameters, not only from a philanthropic standpoint, but also for the sake of the very success of their own
regulatory policies. Unfortunately, the current Gesellschaftian structure of
international trade is incapable of materializing this global empathy.
C. Evanescent Initiatives: Rhetoric Without Action
Although a plethora of provisions and texts have been devoted to development assistance under the WTO rules, including the Doha Declaration,
most are vague and hortatory and lack both concreteness and teeth. While
references to the consideration of particular interests or special needs of
developing countries frequently appear in those legal documents,190 they
engage in international standards-development activities”); see also STANDARDS & GLOBAL TRADE: A
VOICE FOR AFRICA xxxiii-xliii (John S. Wilson and Victor O. Abiola eds., 2003).
189.
Sometimes governments disguise their protectionist intent by using these seemingly legitimate
regulatory objectives. Such disguised protection is often called “protectionism,” in contrast with direct
“protection.” OECD, FOOD SAFETY AND QUALITY ISSUES: TRADE CONSIDERATIONS 53 (1999). See
GLOBALIZATION, GROWTH, AND POVERTY, supra note 16, at 64-65. Based on the possibility of this
protectionist abuse of domestic regulations, many scholars express a negative view of the so-called
“linkage” idea that aims to attain certain regulatory goals by proactively linking them to international
trade disciplines. See T.N. SRINIVASAN, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE MULTILATERAL TRADING
SYSTEM: FROM THE GATT TO THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE FUTURE 73 (1998). As Srinivasan eloquently stated:
The demand of developed countries for a social clause for enforcing a set of core standards
on which there is no political consensus through the threat of trade sanctions is seen by many
developing countries as driven largely by crass protectionist motives. Since increased competition from low-cost imports from developing countries imposes an adjustment cost in terms
of declines in output and employment in import-competing industries of developed countries,
forcing exporting countries to raise their labor standards in the expectation that their costs of
production will rise will thus shift most, if not all, of the costs of adjustment to developing
countries. Clearly, a social clause is nothing but a thinly veiled protectionist device in such a
context.
Id. (emphasis added).
190.
See, e.g., WTO Committee on Trade and Development, WTO Measures Relating to Developing
Country Members: Note by the Secretariat, WT/COMTD/W/10 (Nov. 8, 1995) [hereinafter WTO Committee on Trade and Development (Fourth Session)], available at http://www.wto.org/english/traptop_e/
devel_e/teccop_e/wlo_e.doc; Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, WTO AGREEMENT, Annex 1A, supra
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accomplish little in practice because no criteria for consideration is provided. Thus, the whole assistance regime remains unilateral and at the
mercy of donor countries. Likewise, although those provisions commit the
rich to the provision of advice and assistance to their poor counterparts, no
further explanations follow as to how to assist the poor in building their
administrative and regulatory capacity. Not surprisingly, the result is that
many suspect such commitments are mere lip-service.191 Moreover, most
instruments for capacity-building assistance, such as training courses, seminars, and workshops, tend to be general or inspirational rather than problemdriven.192 These instruments are also applied irregularly and anecdotally,
mostly due to a lack of resources.193 With these predicaments, it would be
very difficult, though not impossible, for the poor to succeed in building to
their capacity.
In general, the lack of political will among the rich countries has led to
a steady decline in the level of Official Development Assistance (ODA)
since 1992.194 This funding restraint is reflected through the technical assistance activities in the WTO Secretariat, which have become dramatically
“overstretched and underfinanced.”195 For instance, only $16 million is currently devoted to technical cooperation missions.196 Even the once vibrant
IF initiative has failed to secure adequate funding.197 The lack of stable and

note 1, art. 1:4 (considering “particular interests”) [hereinafter ATC]; SPS Agreement, supra note 115,
art. 10:1 (considering “special needs” in the preparation and application of SPS measures); TBT Agreement, supra note 116, art. 12:2 (considering special needs in the implementation); Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Annex 1 A, WTO
AGREEMENT, supra note 1, art. 15 (regarding special situations in considering anti-dumping measures);
Agreement on Agriculture, Annex 1A, WTO AGREEMENT, supra note 1, art. 20(c) (considering of special and differential treatment).
191.
See, e.g., SPS Agreement, supra note 115, art. 9:2 (providing assistance where substantial investments are required for complying with trading partners’ requirements); TBT Agreement, supra note
116, art. 11:4 (providing advice and assistance for “the establishment of bodies for the assessment of
conformity with standards”). See generally WTO Committee on Trade and Development (Fourth Session), supra note 190.
192.
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE SERVICES, supra note 91, at 21.
193.
See Mary E. Footer, The WTO, Developing Countries and Technical Assistance for Trade Law
Reform, in GOVERNANCE, DEVELOPMENT AND GLOBALIZATION 353, 366 (Julio Faundez et al. eds.,
2000) (observing that WTO technical assistance may be “inherently contradictory” and “poorly coordinated”).
194.
Agenda 21 Report, supra note 64, para. 7; see also Stiglitz, supra note 21, at 437 (observing that
“aid per capita to the developing world [fell] by nearly a third in the 1990s”).
195.
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE SERVICES, supra note 91, at 18; see also THE WTO AND BEYOND,
supra note 76, at 398; Supachai Panitchpakdi, The Evolving Multilateral Trade System in the New Millennium, 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 419, 444 (2001) (observing that the WTO’s budget constraints
make it less able to assist developing countries in the areas of “[i]nstitutional building, capacity building,
[and] human resource training” than other international institutions, such as the World Bank and the
IMF); cf. Constantine Michalopoulos, The Developing Countries in the WTO, 22 THE WORLD ECON.
117, 142 (1999) (arguing that developing countries should actively participate in the WTO Committee
on Budget, Finance and Administration and raise their collective voice to secure necessary resources for
development assistance).
196.
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE SERVICES, supra note 91, at 18.
197.
Id. at 23.
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predictable budgets prevents technical assistance activities from being designed in an operable fashion over a long-term period.198
Likewise, the recent Doha Declaration, despite its ambitious and promising framework, will not be effective by itself. Words and plans must be
accompanied by actions, and actions must be funded by the major developed countries if they are to materialize. Although the United States recently pledged an additional $5 billion of foreign aid over the next three
years—a step in the right direction—this amount should be put into perspective. As former U.S. President Jimmy Carter pointed out, the current level
of U.S. ODA spending amounts only to one-third of its spending in the
1970s.199 More frustratingly, even if the rich countries were to undertake
more aid programs, these scarce resources would probably be spent on new
issues in which the rich countries have heavily vested interests, such as
competition and investment200—areas that do not signifincantly impact the
poor countries’ economic development. In sum, under the current Gesellschaftian structure of the global trading system in which helping other nations is translated and conducted only through the concept of a donation, not
a duty, it is impossible to expect that true development assistance will materialize into actual change.
IV. TOWARD THE WTO’S GEMEINSCHAFT
A. The WTO’s Gemeinschaft: Its Construct and the Global Empathy
Despite the varying administrative instruments assiduously adopted and
applied for the enhancement of global welfare, the nature of the global Gesellschaft tends to solidify the stratification between the rich and the poor.201
This troubling phenomenon, which John Rawls describes as “unjust,”202 has
the additional effect of stigmatizing poor nations in general. This poses the
question of whether the Gesellschaft should be expanded and strengthened
to the extent that it can eventually deliver, backed by an authority with an
enforcement mechanism, effective (re-)distributional justice? In addition to
being practically infeasible, this Austinian World Government as a SuperGesellschaft has long been rejected by many philosophers, including Immanuel Kant and Emmerich de Vattel. Kant warns, and John Rawls follows,
that the World Government would turn to either a global tyranny or a mass
chaos.203 Vattel also objected to the civitatis maximae which Christian
198.
Press Release, WTO, WTO General Council Informal Meeting (Mar. 28, 2000), http://www.wto
.org/english/news_e/pres00_e/pr173_e.htm.
199.
Jim Wurst, Rich Countries Lauded, Criticized Over New Pledges, UN WIRE, Mar. 20, 2002, at
http://www.unwire.org/UNWire/20020320/24888_story.asp.
200.
See Millions Pledged in Technical Assistance Present New Challenges to WTO, 6 BRIDGES
WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG. 9 (2002), available at http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/02-03-12/story1.htm.
201.
THE CLASSIC STATEMENTS, supra note 6.
202.
JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 114 (2002).
203.
IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE: A PHILOSOPHICAL SKETCH (1795), available at http://w
ww.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/kant/kant1.htm. Instead, Kant envisioned a “Federation of Free States.”
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Wolff proposed, because he feared that small nations would be dwarfed by
big ones in such a republic.204
This dilemma invokes the consideration of the notion of Gemeinschaft
as a solution for the problematic Gesellschaft. Tönnies maintains that the
only way to save the decaying Gesellschaft is to revive the seeds of Gemeinschaft,205 in particular the “Gemeinschaft of [M]ind.”206 Therefore,
Gemeinschaft is an alternative, not a regression, even to Tönnies.207 Perhaps, the nostalgic appeal of Gemeinschaft both as “a symbol and aspiration” derives naturally from our very humanness that seeks various social
relationships such as mutual concern and support.208 Nonetheless, Tönnies’
typological and highly connotative original approach suffers from binarism.
Most of all, such an approach overlooks the fact that the dividing line of the
concepts of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft is not as bright as Tönnies demonstrates theoretically.209 Any Gemeinschaft may hold some attributes or
qualities of Gesellschaft and vice versa. In other words, there may be a Gemeinschaftian Gesellschaft or a Gesellschaftian Gemeinschaft.
Steven Brint attempts to overcome this theoretical shortcoming and better define the appropriate coordinates of the Gemeinschaft. Brint employs
Emile Durkheim’s “disaggregating” methodology, perceiving community
not as a physical entity, but as a set of variable properties of human interaction which can be discovered in Tönnies’ metropolis as well as the classical
loci of Gemeinschaft, such as rural hamlets.210 Of those interactive, communicative Gemeinschaftian properties, four variables are particularly pertinent and useful in constructing the WTO’s Gemeinschaft out of its Gesellschaftian template: “dense and demanding social ties”; “ritual occasions”;
“perceptions of similarity with the physical characteristics, expressive style,
way of life, or historical experience of others”; and “common beliefs in an
idea system, a moral order, an institution, or a group.”211
The first variable, “dense and demanding social ties,” can be witnessed
in an incremental fashion in the contemporary global trading landscape that
is both highly interdependent and integrated. Although such interdependence and integration is primarily centered on economic and materialistic
Id. See also RAWLS, supra note 202, at 36.
204.
See Robert Trout, Vattel’s Natural Law, [hereinafter Vattel’s Natural Law] available at http://ea
st_west_dialogue.tripod.com/vattel/id6.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2004).
205.
THE CLASSIC STATEMENTS, supra note 6.
206.
Reimer, supra note 33, at 229; THE SOCIOLOGY OF COMMUNITY, supra note 33, at 13-20.
207.
Steven Brint, Gemeinschaft Revisited: A Critique and Reconstruction of the Community Concept, 19 SOC. THEORY 1, 2 (2001).
208.
Id. at 1. But cf. Eisabeth Zoller, Institutional Aspects of International Governance, 3 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 121, 123 (1995) (rejecting the possibility of an “international community” and
instead positing the notion of “international society” on the ground that the international society lacks
the “commonness” which can only be found in “national communities”).
209.
Brint, supra note 207, at 3.
210.
Brint observes that this disaggregating approach has been “followed up in productive ways by
many sociologists” such as “Robert K. Merton, Erving Goffman, Travis Hirschi, Rosabeth Moss Kanter,
and William Julius Wilson.” Id.
211.
Id. at 3-4.
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aspects inherent in an ever-expanding market, the very frustration of the
Gesellschaftian failure in addressing social problems such as poverty and
development disparity calls for more social ties to embrace and fix the failure. The original WTO architecture reveals such a social consciousness in
its preamble.212 The subsequent initiative represented by the Doha Development Round (DDR)213 further promotes certain social connectedness
within the system. The WTO also highlights inclusiveness by warning
against the phenomenon of the marginalization of its poorest members and
urges other members to accommodate those poorest members through development assistance.214 Even outside the institutional purview of the WTO,
a variety of capacity-building or other development-oriented attempts, such
as the “Global Compact,”215 are being made toward building these social
ties through the medium of inter-governmental or non-governmental organizations.
The second and third variables, “ritual occasions” and “perceptions of
similarity with the physical characteristics, expressive style, way of life, or
historical experience of others,”216 may be found in the WTO’s membership
structure. Members are entitled, and in a sense privileged, to participate in a
variety of ritual occasions, such as various committee and council meetings
under the auspices of the WTO. These ritual occasions nurture a sense of
belonging and group identity.217 Similarly, common modus operandi within
the WTO system provide members with “social identifications,” which are
“strongly related to feelings of safety and comfort.”218 This social identification offers an explanation as to why many countries are still queuing to be-

212.
WTO AGREEMENT, supra note 1, pmbl. (“Recognizing further that there is need for positive
efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and especially the least developed among them,
secure a share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development . . . .”).
213.
WTO, Doha WTO Ministerial 2001: Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/1, para. 2 (Nov. 14,
2001), available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mindecl_e/htm (“Recalling the Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement, we shall continue to make positive efforts designed to ensure that
developing countries, and especially the least-developed among them, secure a share in the growth of
world trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development.”).
214.
Id. at para. 3 (“We recognize the particular vulnerability of the least-developed countries and the
special structural difficulties they face in the global economy. We are committed to addressing the marginalization of least-developed countries in international trade and to improving their effective participation in the multilateral trading system.”).
215.
United Nations Global Compact, About the GC: General Information About the Global Compact, Its Principles, Objectives, and Operations, at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/Portal/Default.asp
(last visited Feb. 16, 2004) (“Through the power of collective action, the Global Compact seeks to advance responsible corporate citizenship so that business can be part of the solution to the challenges of
globalisation. In this way, the private sector—in partnership with other social actors—can help realize
the Secretary-General’s vision: a more sustainable and inclusive global economy.”).
216.
Brint, supra note 207, at 3.
217.
Id. at 4; see EMILE DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF RELIGIOUS LIFE 303-87 (Karen E.
Fields trans., 1995) (discussing the purposes of rituals). See generally W. LLOYD WARNER & PAUL S.
LUNT, THE SOCIAL LIFE OF A MODERN COMMUNITY (1941); RANDALL COLLINS, THEORETICAL
SOCIOLOGY (1988).
218.
Brint, supra note 207, at 4. See generally RICHARD RODRIGUEZ, HUNGER OF MEMORY: THE
EDUCATION OF RICHARD RODRIGUEZ (1981).
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come a WTO member, thus gaining access to the mainstream of the global
trading system.219
The fourth and final variable, “common beliefs in an idea system, a
moral order, an institution, or a group,” is teleological, and in fact hearkens
back to the genesis of the prototypical Gesellschaft (GATT 1947).220 Building a community of peace and prosperity via the commercial bond is the
seed of this Kantian communitarian telos, first sown in the initial enterprise
of GATT 1947, after countries again witnessed the tragic consequences of
economic balkanization precipitated by the failed global Gesellschaft.221
Interestingly, these common beliefs may also be retranslated into a logical
outcome of interest-based observation. This nascent community element
may result from enlightened self-interests that bind the hands of sovereign
countries to the mast of GATT against the sirens of mutually destructive
parochialism or protectionism.222 Or, it may be a corollary of the “coordination game” to overcome the prisoners’ dilemma from the game theory
standpoint.223 Or, an institutional reconstruction of the global trading system
via GATT might have simply been compatible with the political interests of
the Allies, in particular the United States.224 Although theoretically captivating, these often pessimistic and even scornful “anti-community” perspectives225 tend only to recount—and thus highlight—the very properties of
Gesellschaft, such as power and interest, which we strive to overcome
through the construction of the WTO’s Gemeinschaft.
Based on human interactions, these four variables shape the conceptual
contour of the WTO’s Gemeinschaft. These communitarian human interactions, which can be paraphrased as “communication”226 or “discourse,”227
219.
See WTO, Current Status of Individual Accessions, at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc
_e/status_e.htm (Updated Mar. 2004).
220.
Brint, supra note 207, at 3-4.
221.
SUNGJOON CHO, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL REGULATION: A REFORM AGENDA OF THE
GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 11-12 (2003) [hereinafter A REFORM AGENDA].
222.
See Robert E. Hudec, GATT or GABB? The Future Design of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, 80 YALE L.J. 1299, 1309-36 (1971); Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Settlement
Procedure: An Overview of the First Three Years, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 10 (1999).
223.
See Kal Raustiala, Compliance and Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation, 32
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 387, 400-01 (2000); Brett Frischmann, A Dynamic Institutional Theory of
International Law, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 679, 750-52 (2003).
224.
See Joseph M. Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest
Liberal Institutionalism, 42 INT’L ORG. 485 (1988); JOANNE GOWA, ALLIES, ADVERSARIES AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1994); Joanne Gowa & Edward D. Mansfield, Power Politics and International Trade, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 408 (1993). But cf. Stephen D. Krasner, State Power and the Structure of International Trade, 28 WORLD POL. 317 (1976) (discussing the idea that an uneven distribution
of political power will create a more open trading scheme).
225.
Brint, supra note 207, at 6. Ruth Glass even declared that community studies were “the poor
sociologist’s substitute for the novel.” Reimer, supra note 33, at 230. See COLLIN BELL & HOWARD
NEWBY, COMMUNITY STUDIES: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE LOCAL COMMUNITY 13
(1971).
226.
Thomas McCarthy, Translator’s Introduction to 1 JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: REASON AND THE RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY vi (Thomas McCarthy
trans., 1984). McCarthy states that Habermas agrees that communication renders “individual purposive
actions” coordinated and integrated with social teleology. Id. at ix.
227.
Thomas McCarthy, Habermas, in A COMPANION TO CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY 397, 402
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are operated and facilitated by “cooperation.”228 Only through this cooperative communication or discourse among different members, rich and poor,
will global empathy be established, bringing the development crisis to the
attention of all. Only through this global empathy can apparent contradictions of values in different corners of the world be mediated and reconciled.
The rich would not force the poor to conform to unilateral regulations set by
the former, instead the rich would situate themselves in the position of the
poor and realize that such regulatory unilateralism may devastate the economic development of the poor. Thus, we in the WTO’s Gemeinschaft
could truly comprehend, immune from parochial prejudice, that unilateral
protection of the “Flippers” (dolphins) in rich countries may threaten the
livelihood of small Mexican tuna fishermen in the absence of appropriate
(re-)distributive justice on a global scale.229 We would then finally move
from rhetoric to action.
This global empathy is not generated merely by a pure egalitarian or
philanthropic impulse. It is, in fact, an outgrowth of human reason or rationality. Although it is often associated with self-interest rather than empathy,
human reason is not necessarily the type of calculative and strategic behavior reminiscent of Justice Holmes’ “bad man.”230 On the contrary, “communicative rationality” 231 can extend our empathy by enabling the projection
of individual life experiences into the public sphere (that is, the WTO’s
Gemeinschaft) in which human rationality is continuously tested and enriched by the connectedness and interdependence of human existence. In
sum, the ethics of our Gemeinschaftian discourse, as a reconstructed Kantian “practical reason,” mandate us to exercise “perspective-taking” and
build a moment of empathy.232

(Simon Critchley & William R. Schroeder eds., 1999); see also Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative,
97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4-11 (1983). To Cover, a community or society is a nomos, a normative universe in
which law cannot be separated by narratives or discourse concerning the history, literature, and purpose
of the community or society. Id.
228.
Habermas’ view is that values such as truth and justice cannot be earned as an outcome, but can
be reached only in a procedural sense—that is, via a dialogue—in which argumentation or justification is
rationally accepted by means of “perspective-taking” or “empathy.” McCarthy, supra note 227, at 402.
This communicative cooperation is regarded as “discourse ethics,” which is nothing but a “reconstruction of Immanuel Kant’s idea of practical reason.” Id.; see also Ward, supra note 5.
229.
GATT Dispute Panel Report on United States, Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, unadopted,
DS21/R-39S/155 (Sept. 3, 1991), available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/tunadolp
hinI.pdf.
230.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897) (“If you want
to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only for the material
consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reason for
conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience.”) (emphasis
added).
231.
McCarthy, supra note 227, at 404.
232.
Id. at 402.
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B. The Law of Nations (Jus Gentium) Revisited
1. Jus Gentium in the Gemeinschaftian Context
Admittedly, the WTO’s Gemeinschaft is an ideality, rather than a phenomenon. To bridge the gap between this ideality and reality, and to drive
the often frustrating what is toward what ought to be, we need a norm or
law as a steering mechanism.233 In constructing the WTO’s Gemeinschaft,
law is an indispensable communicative device or language, the use of which
continuously increases the possibilities of acceptable realities, channeled by
the equation of global empathy. Therefore, as Ronald Dworkin submits, law
is “constructive” in that it “show[s] the best route to a better future” and
thus “unifying” despite divergent interests and projects scattered in the
community.234
This very nature of law as a communicative device is especially imperative within the context of the WTO’s Gemeinschaft, which is an imagined
community where domestic analogies of political deliberation are dramatically limited.235 Therefore, members rely heavily on law as a means of reflecting others’ behaviors, designing their own, and thus communicating
with one another. Furthermore, atomic players such as consumers and producers, in addition to states, give and take signals via the translating of the
law (and thus the communicative function), which predicates the WTO’s
Gemeinschaft on systematic values such as stability and predictability.236
Even in a pragmatist sense, this invisible communicative device is superior
to other decisional mechanisms institutionalized in the WTO, such as the
General Council, whose material restraints, including unrealistic voting
rules237 and other physical inconveniences,238 tend to discourage any efficient and meaningful discourse within the community.239
When we construe law as an essential communicative device largely
supplementing, or even supplanting, political deliberations, our immediate
attention tends to be directed toward existing conventions or written legal
documents. As for basic legislation in the field of development, one might

233.
Cf. Cover, supra note 227, at 9-10 (discussing law as it fits into a normative system).
234.
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 413 (1986)
235.
Brint, supra note 207, at 11.
236.
Cf. WTO, WTO Panel Report on United States—Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974,
WT/DS152/R, para. 7.76 (Dec. 22, 1999), available at http://www.docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t
/WT/DS/152R.doc. “The security and predictability in question are of ‘the multilateral trading system.’
The multilateral trading system is, per force, composed not only of States but also, indeed mostly, of
individual economic operators. The lack of security and predictability affects mostly these individual
operators.” Id. (emphasis added).
237.
WTO Agreement, supra note 1, art. IX, paras. 1-4 (stipulating “consensus” and “super-majority”
rules).
238.
See Supachai Panitchpakdi, Keynote Address: The Evolving Multilateral Trade System in the
New Millennium, 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 419, 439-40 (2001) (describing a dilemma of the “green
room” process).
239.
Id.
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refer to the “Declaration on the Right to Development,”240 which was
adopted in the UN General Assembly on December 4, 1986. Despite its
symbolic significance(in the sense that it elevated the development issue to
the realm of human rights), the Declaration suffers from its abstract and
vague structure. It leaves open a myriad of legal questions, such as the determination of beneficiaries and duty-holders, as well as its enforceability.241 The Doha Work Program shares the same problem. As previously
discussed, the Work Program itself would have difficulty providing any
immediate legal force on its own accord.
Thus, one might reasonably speculate that teeth should be added to
these legislative instruments to overcome their impotent nature. In this context, some scholars even suggest that technical assistance based on “best
endeavors” should be converted to binding obligations whose failure would
be adjudicated in the WTO dispute settlement system.242 Though this suggestion sounds impressive, the practical difficulty of amendment as well as
the political sensitivity of this issue, particularly from the standpoint of developed countries, undermines its feasibility. Instead of hastily deriving
adjudication directly from a foundational document, such as the Doha Declaration (Work Program), the global trading community should consider the
document as a “framework convention” (as seen in many environmental
treaties) which spawns a network of subsequent sub-agreements or protocols that are necessary for effective micro-level implementation of the
framework convention.243 These sub-agreements or protocols should not
merely declare the goodwill rhetoric that has been frustratingly repeated
throughout GATT history; they should contain detailed criteria and standards as to what should be done to provide development assistance and how
those initiatives should be funded.
However, these sub-agreements or protocols are not easy to obtain because most formal legislation in the WTO context must take the form of a
treaty, which is extremely hard to create under the current WTO mechanism.244 Even if the WTO was equipped with a workable decision-making
240.
G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 186, U.N. Doc. A/41/53 (1986).
241.
See Isabella D. Bunn, The Right to Development: Implications for International Economic Law,
15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1425, 1434-35 (2000).
242.
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE SERVICES, supra note 91, at 11-12; THE WTO AND BEYOND, supra
note 76, at 242-43.
243.
In the field of international environmental law, a “framework convention” provides a basic
structure of regulation, subsequently followed by more detailed “protocols.” Therefore, regulations as
well as their negotiations tend to be conducted in an incremental fashion, minimizing unnecessary tension and conflict. See, e.g., United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 102-38, available at http://www.unfcc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf; Montreal
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-10, 1522
U.N.T.S 3; Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, T.I.A.S. No. 11,
097, 1513 U.N.T.S. 293.
244.
See John H. Jackson, Appraising the Launch and Functioning of the WTO, 39 GERMAN Y.B.
INT’L L. 20, 39 (1996) (“[T]he decision-making and voting procedures of the WTO, although much
improved over the GATT, still leave much to be desired. It is not clear how the consensus practice will
proceed, particularly given the large number of countries now or soon involved.”).
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mechanism, the depth of its regulations would likely be minimal in a traditional treaty setting for several reasons. First, concluding a treaty is a
lengthy and painstaking enterprise. Most treaties are negotiated, signed and
ratified in a slow and tortuous manner. More often, a loss of passion or lack
of momentum in the middle of the treaty-making process hinders its further
development. On top of this, due to its strict formality, a treaty is likely to
be plagued by bureaucratic over-circumspection and red tape throughout the
whole process. Accordingly, at the very end, the substance that the states
manage to agree upon may not be beneficial, despite the stylistic and linguistic elegance of the treaty.245 Second, a treaty-making process is basically political; it calls for a large amount of political capital that can accommodate the cost of both initiation and compromise. Moreover, the
whole process tends to be swamped by vehement and continuous lobbying
from interest groups or domestic constituencies, thereby resulting in the
drawing of a cat instead of a lion. Third, because countries do not want to be
shamed as “violators,” they tend not to commit themselves to formally binding pacts.246 Moreover, most countries are eager to retain as much room as
possible for future flexibility, leading states to minimize the scope of their
commitments in any formally binding treaty. Very often, treaties’ practical
effects are also qualified by express reservations. Fourth, treaty texts are
usually vague and nebulous enough to raise the possibility of self-serving
interpretations by signatories, and hence an unsatisfying level of compliance. Fifth, most treaties are static and hard to amend. Even if the initial
scope of regulation was sufficient, the lack of dynamism inherent in treaties
tends to prevent them from keeping pace with subsequently rising development demands.
In sum, law in the form of mere documents is deficient as an effective
communicative tool. Although the WTO retains a plethora of agreements
and provisions, the fact of which is deemed a legal evolution from GATT
1947 in many ways,247 such corpus juris alone still fails to fulfill the WTO’s
Gemeinschaftian aspirations under the Gesellschaftian power politics. Even
with the presence of institutionalized development assistance within the
WTO, local politics of the rich rampantly ignore basic developmental needs
of the poor.248 Therefore, this failure is better characterized as a general lack
of normative consciousness than a mere violation or inadequacy of the
rules. Only through Gemeinschaftian discourses and consequent global empathy can this failure be reversed. Current WTO rules as lex lata derive
245.
See John H. Jackson, International Economic Law in Times That Are Interesting, 3 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 3, 8 (2000) (stating that “[t]reaties are often an awkward albeit necessary method of designing
institutions needed in today’s interdependent world, but they do not solve many problems”).
246.
See Charles Lipson, Why Are Some International Agreements Informal, 45 INT’L ORG. 495, 53738 (1991) (summarizing the benefits of informal agreements vis-à-vis formal agreements (treaties),
including a non-binding nature).
247.
See generally Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Transformation of the World Trading System
through the 1994 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L. 161 (1995).
248.
See supra Part III.A.
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from a series of compromised negotiational outcomes. Accordingly, these
rules inevitably radiate the political preferences of the rich and powerful
members; they are often contrary to the fundamental norm of free trade or
anti-protection. Consequently, after a half-century of institutional evolution,
the WTO still underperforms its foremost agendum. Therefore, the WTO’s
Gemeinschaft must function to allow the free trade mechanism to bear its
original distributive justice without undue political interference and manipulation. The current WTO should rise above those positivistic—and thus excusable—lex, and construct an ultimate normative referential precept, jus,
which not only guides and regulates members’ behaviors but also constitutes the Gemeinschaft. It is this very reason why we should pursue the
“Law of Nations” (“jus gentium”) not only as a source of law premised on
the Thomist “distinguo,”249 but also as central hermeneutics which should
reveal, through interpretations, the Gemeinschaftian telos of the WTO.
In fact, the history of jus gentium eloquently relates its supreme communitarian aspiration, a virtuous cycle of common peace and prosperity.
Starting from a municipal system in the Roman Empire, jus gentium earned
its international appeal after the Thirty Years War devastated several centuries’ brilliant civilizational achievements in Europe.250 After witnessing the
misery of the war, pioneering philosophers and legal scholars strived to
achieve a mutually supportive and peaceful human community. These innovators attempted to tame and regulate brutal and irrational human behaviors—often committed in the name of sovereignty—through jus gentium.
Remarkably, Leibniz formulates universal justice as the discovery of
one’s own benefit in benefiting others, and thus mankind.251 He sermonizes
through his life the precept that a person’s true felicity comes only from
“locating their identity in benefitting mankind and their posterity.”252
Throughout his works, including the Elementra Juris Naturali and the Codex Juris Gentium, Leibniz emphasizes that empathy and compassion toward others is “never absurdity nor negligence” and that “[u]njust is my
good that causes harm to others.”253 Therefore, his version of natural law
(jus naturale) is that “[t]he most perfect society is that whose purpose is the
universal and supreme happiness.”254 Leibniz believes that the idea of natural law as a robust manifestation of egalitarian ethics can be reincarnated in
the real world, in accordance with the contingence of time and place.255 Vat249.
ROSCOE POUND, A WORLD LEGAL ORDER: LAW AND LAWS IN RELATION TO WORLD LAW 4
(1959).
250.
See INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, at xxix-xxx (Lori F. Damrosch et al. eds.,
4th ed. 2001).
251.
Robert Trout, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness: How the Natural Law Concept of
G.W. Leibniz Inspired America’s Founding Fathers (pt. 2), FIDELIO, Spring 1997, available at http://ww
w.schillerinstitute.org/fid_97-01/971_vattel-2.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2005).
252.
Id.
253.
HIDEAKI HIRANO, LEIBNIZ’S CULTURAL PLURALISM AND NATURAL LAW 42 (1997), http://prof.
mt.tama.hosei.ac.jp/~hhirano/academia/leibniz.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2004).
254.
Trout, supra note 251, available at http://www.schillerinstitute.org/fid_97-01/971_vattel-2.html.
255.
HIRANO, supra note 253, at 14.
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tel, based on the Leibnizian natural law perspective, concretized the concept
of jus gentium. He stresses that each man’s selfish pursuit of interest without consideration of the welfare of others inevitably falls into the crack of
wretchedness, and argues that we should first endeavor to promote the general happiness of mankind, which will be rewarded by the same deed from
others.256 Therefore, Vattel defines the first general law of nations as the
following: “[E]ach individual nation is bound to contribute every thing in
her power to the happiness and perfection of all the others.”257
This “duty to assist” as the foremost form of the Law of Nations has
also been adopted and advocated by modern philosophers such as John
Rawls. Rawls acknowledges that certain societies may be burdened in that
they lack material resources needed to be well-ordered, and that wellordered and thus affluent peoples have a duty to assist these “burdened societies.”258 He elevates this duty to one of the “Principles of the Law of
Peoples.”259 Certainly, this communitarian duty bases its legitimacy on the
high probability that no member participating in the WTO discourse and
communication would disapprove of it.260 It is in fact a definitional feature
of the Gemeinschaft, clad with a norm.
2. The Gemeinschaftian Mission of Jus Gentium: Regulating Politics
The WTO’s development failure, which is a defining feature of antiGemeinschaft, is attributable largely to the mechanics of domestic politics.
Ironically, the protectionist barriers imposed by the rich on basic products,
such as the agricultural products and textiles, hurt the poor and also damage
their own domestic constituencies. Consumers have a preference for cheap
products, producers want cheap (foreign) raw materials to manufacture upper-level products, and retailers depend on low input prices in order to establish sustainable profit margins. However, the damage suffered by domestic economic players in the rich nations is rather indirect and diffuse. It provides them with little incentive to organize and defend their interests by
contesting those trade barriers.261 Therefore, these consumers, producers,
and retailers tend to be underrepresented in terms of trade policy development.

256.
Vattel’s Natural Law, supra note 204 (citing VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, PRELIMINARIES,
sec. 10 (1758)).
257.
Id. (citing VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, PRELIMINARIES, sec. 13 (1758)).
258.
RAWLS, supra note 202, at 106.
259.
Id. at 37.
260.
McCarthy, supra note 227, at 402; JÜRGEN HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 66 (Christian Lenhardt & Shierry Weber Nicholsen trans., 1990).
261.
See Judith Goldstein, International Institutions and Domestic Politics: GATT, WTO, and the
Liberalization of International Trade, in INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 94, at 140; C.
FRED BERGSTEN, THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN 2000, (Int’l Inst.
of Econ., Working Paper No. 99-6, 1999), available at http://www.iie.com/publications/wp/1999/996.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2004).
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In contrast, domestic producers whose products compete with cheap
foreign imports in the domestic market tend to have a more direct interest in
maintaining the trade barriers than other domestic actors. This is mainly due
to the fear of losing the “competition” to the foreign producers. Consequently, they tend to engage in well-organized lobbying activities.262 Those
producers tend to be overrepresented in terms of trade policies. This discrepancy in representation translates into political failure, or worse, “constitutional failure”263 from a Madisonian perspective.264 Moreover, its impact
is not confined to the domestic sphere. The distortion in domestic interest
representation will eventually hurt those developing countries that produce
basic input products, which in turn will undermine their economic base.
The elimination of domestic protection has proven to be a political challenge in developed countries. However, it would be even more difficult for
those developed countries to share their national resources with other developing countries to the extent necessary for the latter to improve their economic situation. Politicians basically represent and are held accountable to
their domestic constituencies—groups not known to be advocates of international economic justice at the expense of their own wealth. Even if some
politicians realize a serious need for development assistance from an economic, humanitarian, or other perspective, they would not risk their political
lives to urge their constituencies to contribute their precious money to the
development of a far-away poor country.265
It is often and accurately stated that all politics is local.266 While development assistance requires a long-term commitment to realize a tangible
outcome in an area such as capacity-building, most politicians have a shortsighted perspective on account of the length of the typical election cycle.
Advocating a long-term project where the real outcome may materialize
after they are out of office would not be a wise political strategy.267 This
262.
See, e.g., Bush the Anti-Globalizer, ECONOMIST, May 11, 2002, at 14, 16 (criticizing the United
States’ new farm bill, which would severely undermine free trade principles to protect the domestic
agricultural sector, but eventually benefit only the “biggest and richest 10%” of farmers); Cleansing the
Augean Stables, ECONOMIST, July 13, 2002, at 12 (criticizing the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP) for spending half of the EU budget to feed a small population of farmers who are “less than 5% of
the workforce”). Cf. UN WIRE (Stern), supra note 143 (reporting that World Bank Chief Economist
Nicholas Stern accused rich countries of hypocrisy for urging free trade in the developing world “while
imposing protectionist measures that cater to powerful special interests”).
263.
ROBERT E. HUDEC, ESSAYS ON THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 133 (1999) (quoting Jan Tumlir that “[p]rotectionism is a constitutional failure”). See generally JAN TUMLIR,
PROTECTIONISM: TRADE POLICY IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES (1985).
264.
See Peter M. Gerhart, The Two Constitutional Visions of the World Trade Organization, 24 U.
PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1, 19-20 (2003) (highlighting the WTO’s “internal, economic” vision as a “healthy
antidote” to parochial interests).
265.
See Jack Goldsmith, LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND COSMOPOLITAN DUTY, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1667,
1675-82 (2003).
266.
Cf. Shaffer, supra note 187, at 609, at http://www.UNWire/20020930/29272_story.asp (observing that protection costs imposed on domestic constituencies are less transparent than the costs of other
positive programs, and accordingly politicians tend to “respond more favorably” to protectionism against
“unrepresented foreigners”). See generally TIP O’NEILL, ALL POLITICS IS LOCAL: AND OTHER RULES OF
THE GAME (1994).
267.
Of course, under the peculiar situation of the Cold War, political motivations for development
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inherent myopia of domestic politics lies at the heart of the failed Gesellschaft of GATT and the WTO. Power-oriented politics continue to distort
and manipulate free trade and basic market mechanisms. Sadly, if used correctly, these tools could transform the economic standing of the poor by
allowing them to acquire foreign currencies and reinvest them for further
development.
In the face of such political failure, jus gentium of international trade
signifies a perspectival shift from negotiational politics to a norm which
checks politics, promotes free trade, and achieves effective development
assistance. In this regard, a functional, operational mission of jus gentium
lies in “legalization,”268 which can be broadly defined as a tendency to increase reliance on norms and normative pull in the context of trade relations
between the rich and the poor. Legalization is a practical manifestation of
jus gentium that realizes the WTO’s Gemeinschaft by imbuing stability and
aid could remain. However, in a post-Cold War era, the volume of foreign aid by rich countries has
substantially shrunk. See WORLD TRADE AND PAYMENTS, supra note 54, at 299.
268.
No unified definition of “legalization” exists. Many scholars of international law as well as
international relations have long used the term legalization or its siblings—such as “judicialization” or
“juridicization”—within different contexts and with different meanings. Arie Reich provided for a quite
general concept of juridicization, which was defined as a tendency of regulating trade relations by “using
norms and enforcement procedures that are LEGAL in character,” thereby “creat[ing] significant limitations on the sovereignty of the States.” Arie Reich, From Diplomacy to Law: The Juridicization of International Trade Relations, 17 NW. J. INT’L & BUS. 775, 776 (1996-97). However, Reich conceptually
distinguished between juridicization and legalization, which was defined as “making lawful a phenomenon which prior thereto was against the law.” Id. at 777 n.3. Other scholars explored legalization from a
judicial standpoint, highlighting a dispute settlement mechanism involving international courts or tribunals. See Robert E. Hudec, The Judicialization of GATT Dispute Settlement, in IN WHOSE INTEREST?:
DUE PROCESS AND TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 9-43 (Michael M. Hart & Debra P.
Steger eds., 1992); Alec Stone Sweet, The New GATT: Dispute Resolution and the Judicialization of the
Trade Regime in LAW ABOVE NATIONS: SUPRANATIONAL COURTS AND THE LEGALIZATION OF POLITICS
138 (Mary L. Volcansek ed., 1997) (observing that “WTO legal norms gradually embed themselves
within national legal systems, either by domestic legislative actions or judicial decisions.”). More recently, Kenneth Abbott and other legal scholars and political scientists have attempted to define legalization in a clearer and more analytical fashion. Based on the proposition that legalization refers to a “particular set of characteristics that institutions may (or may not) possess,” they define legalization along
three dimensions: “obligation,” which means that states or other actors are bound by rules or commitments; “precision,” which means that those rules or commitments are determinate; and “delegation,”
which means that third parties are authorized to interpret and apply those rules as well as resolve disputes. Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, in LEGALIZATION AND WORLD POLITICS
17 (Judith L. Goldstein et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter LEGALIZATION]. A wide spectrum exists in each of
these dimensions, ranging from “hard” to “soft” legalization. Id. at 17-18. This multi-dimensional definition of legalization, despite its analytical sharpness and clarity, cannot be free from controversy mainly
due to its inherent political overtone. In other words, it basically assumes that legalization as institutionalization is a matter of choice by states, insinuating that states can freely withdraw their initial choice of
legalization. Id. at 7. Finally, legalization should be distinguished from “constitutionalization,” which
deals more deeply with “foundational problems of social order.” Id. at 5. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann,
How to Constitutionalize International Law and Foreign Policy for the Benefit of Civil Society?, 20
MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 30 (1998). But see Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaidis, Legitimacy and Global
Governance: Why Constitutionalizing the WTO is a Step Too Far in EFFICIENCY EQUITY &
LEGITIMACY: THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM 227-30 (Roger B. Porter et
al. eds., 2001). However, this constitutionalization should also be differentiated from the “constitutional
understanding” of international trade law posited by John Jackson. See WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra
note 11, at 339; John H. Jackson, Reflections on International Economic Law, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON.
L. 17, 25-28 (1996); John H. Jackson, Perspectives on Regionalism in Trade Relations, 27 LAW & POL’Y
INT’L BUS. 873, 873 (1996) [hereinafter Perspectives on Regionalism].
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predictability in development-related issues and tames political whims and
uncertainty by making them more costly than ever.269 Therefore, legalization eventually communicates with the concept of a “trade constitution,” in
the sense that it denotes “an intricate set of constraints imposed by a variety
of rules or legal norms” in a particular institutional setting.270
3. The Dual Nature of Implementing Jus Gentium
The aforementioned “duty to assist” as the fundamental Law of Nations
of the WTO’s Gemeinschaft can be implemented under the WTO’s everyday operation in two different forms—negative and positive.
The first form of jus gentium of international trade is the most fundamental tenet of international trade, which is nothing but a negative obligation of anti-protection. Free trade without protection is a superior developmental apparatus to any special trade preferences or aid—aid without free
trade never surpasses free trade without aid. Yet, the realities of the political
economy of the rich, in addition to the legal vacuum or lacunae that is inevitable under positivistic conventions, often compromise this supreme norm.
Therefore, the first mode of implementing jus gentium in the WTO’s Gemeinschaft is to save the fallen mission of the global Gesellschaft—free
trade—and thus pave a firm ground for international economic justice by
enabling, and eventually helping, the poor to make the most of their comparative advantage.
Importantly, trade jurisprudence can contribute to realizing this negative
mode of jus gentium of international trade by declaring and expounding the
unwritten law of development. Facing various cases that intersect trade and
development, dispute settlement organs, such as the WTO panels and the
Appellate Body, can authoritatively strike down various forms of protectionist and other WTO-illegal measures adopted and applied by developed
countries, which hurt developing countries.271 The advanced and highly
calibrated dispute settlement mechanism under the WTO tends to nurture
such case law and enhance the arbiters’ authority vis-à-vis the old GATT.272
Development case law reverberates in future cases, influencing and determining state behavior in this field. In fact, in contrast with various past leg269.
See Goldstein, supra note 261, at 149, 151; see also ROBERT KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY:
COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 97 (1984).
270.
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 11, at 339 (2d ed. 1997); JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION: CONSTITUTION AND JURISPRUDENCE 101-04 (1998); John H. Jackson, Reflections on International Economic Law, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 17, 25-28 (1996); Perspectives on
Regionalism, supra note 268, at 873; see also Antonio F. Perez, WTO and U.N. Law: Institutional Comity in National Security, 23 YALE J. INT’L L. 301, 316-24 (1998) (discussing Professor Jackson’s constitutional premise of international trade law).
271.
Cf. Julio Lacarte-Muró & Petina Gappah, Developing Countries and the WTO Legal and Dispute Settlement System: A View from the Bench, 3 J. INT’L ECON. L. 395, 395-401 (2000) (noting the
active participation in the WTO dispute settlement system by the developing countries with the increasing awareness of the benefits derived from participation).
272.
Cf. Goldstein, supra note 261, at 149 (stating that the new dispute settlement mechanism does
not allow countries to be punished if they fail to live up to their WTO obligations).
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islative initiatives that started with fanfare but ended with a fizz, international trade tribunals have recently responded to developmental concerns in
a quiet, yet effective manner. They often speak softly but carry a big stick.
Even without relying on an eventual enforcement mechanism (sanctions),
normative radiation emitted against the background of rich jurisprudence
can successfully check the problematic behaviors of the developed countries. In this regard, Robert Hudec observes that “[t]he key point . . . is that a
legal ruling without retaliation can still be an effective policy tool for a developing country seeking to reverse a legal violation by a larger country.”273
This negative mode of jurisprudence tends to police developed countries’ protectionism and push for further trade liberalization so that developing countries can secure better access to developed markets for manufactured as well as agricultural products. For instance, in 1999 the WTO Appellate Body (AB) blocked Turkey’s attempt to launch a new quantitative
restriction on textiles imported from India in Turkish Quantitative Restrictions (QRs).274 In this case, Turkey, a developing country, actually introduced a new quota.275 However, the EU left Turkey, who had already signed
an association agreement with the EU, no option but to replicate the preexisting quota that formed part of the EU’s common external trade policies.276 Turkey justified the new quota by invoking the GATT Article XXIV
exception, arguing that its association agreement with the EU exempted the
quota under Article XXIV.277 If accepted, the new quota would have
harmed India’s economic development, since textiles represent one of its
main exports. However, the AB interpreted Article XXIV not as an exception, but as an important parameter of trade liberalization. According to the
AB, regional trade agreements are meaningful only to the extent that they
promote further liberalization and do not establish new restrictions against
non-member countries like India.278 This decision yields a critical implication in terms of development, in which case law will prevent developed
countries from expanding their pre-existing trade barriers against developing countries in the name of regional trade agreements.
As another example of negative jurisprudence regulating rich countries’
protectionist trade policies, the recent U.S.—Combed Cotton Yarn279 decision merits special attention. Policies affecting textiles are commonly
known as some of the “hardest-fought” issues under the old GATT and the
273.
Robert E. Hudec, The Adequacy of WTO Dispute Settlement Remedies: A Developing Country
Perspective, in HANDBOOK, supra note 27, at 83 (emphasis added).
274.
WTO Appellate Body, Turkey—Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products,
WT/DS34/AB/R, paras. 64-66 (Nov. 19, 1999) [hereinafter Turkish QRs], available at http://www.wto.o
rg/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm.
275.
Id. at para. 2.
276.
Id. at para 3.
277.
Id. at para. 17.
278.
Id. at para. 57.
279.
WTO Appellate Body, United States—Transitional Safeguard Measure on Combed Cotton Yarn
from Pakistan, WT/DS192/AB/R (Oct. 8, 2001) [hereinafter U.S.—Combed Cotton Yarn], available at
htt p://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm.
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new WTO system.280 Spurred by domestic lobbies, developed countries
have desperately protected this industry—despite the absence of comparative advantage—primarily through bilateral import quotas and VERs under
the Multifiber Arrangement.281 Such a blatant antithesis of free trade has
consistently plagued developing countries, such as Pakistan, whose chief
comparative advantage lies in this sector—their gains from trade have been
forfeited due to this protectionism. Naturally, finding a remedy to this distorted situation was one of the most grave missions of the Uruguay Round.
The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC)282 was created for the purpose of phasing out those trade restrictions under the MFA by fully integrating the textiles and clothing sector into the WTO discipline.283 However,
developed countries, such as the United States and the EU, have failed to
take any positive steps in implementing the ATC even as the 2005 deadline
draws near.284 Critically, the vague text of the ATC, which pursues the progressive integration of textiles and clothing to the WTO system, rather than
specifying a concrete timetable for phase-out of quotas, provides developed
countries with an excuse for delay or lack of effort in implementing the
agreement.285 To make things worse for developing countries, the ATC also
provides for a “transitional safeguard mechanism” under which developed
countries can still protect their domestic textiles and clothing industries under certain circumstances.286
Against this gloomy background, the case was brought before the WTO.
Pakistan complained that the United States unduly restricted imports of
Pakistani yarn through the transitional safeguard mechanism under the
ATC, while the United States attempted to justify its action by arguing that
the increased Pakistani yarn imports caused “serious damage, and actual
threat thereof,” to its domestic industry.287 In addition to the tedious phasing-out of textiles quotas under the ATC, the existence of this special safeguard clause is extremely vexing to textile-exporting countries like Pakistan. It would be a serious blow to developing countries if the clause functioned as a new trade barrier through overly generous interpretations by the
panel or the AB. However, the AB imposed firm discipline in invoking the
clause. Upholding the panel’s findings, the AB declared the U.S. transitional safeguard mechanism illegal under the ATC, pointing out that the
United States improperly narrowed the scope of the affected domestic industry and that it also exaggerated damages from Pakistani yarn imports by
280.
WTO, Trade Topics: Textiles, at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/texti_e/texti_e.htm (last
visited Feb. 23, 2004).
281.
See THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 82, at 375-77.
282.
See supra note 190.
283.
WTO, supra note 280.
284.
See Alice J.H. Wohn, Towards GATT Integration: Circumventing Quantitative Restrictions on
Textiles and Apparel Trade Under the Multi-Fiber Arrangement, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 375, 37576 (2001); Dunoff, supra note 187, at 981.
285.
GLOBALIZATION, GROWTH, AND POVERTY, supra note 16, at 61.
286.
ATC, supra note 190, art. 6.
287.
U.S.—Combed Cotton Yarn, supra note 280, paras. 1-2.
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not examining the effects of imports from Mexico.288 Undoubtedly, this
strict interpretation of the traditional safeguard mechanism suits the objective of the ATC—“further liberalization of trade”289—thereby eventually
responding to the concerns of developing countries that export textiles and
clothing.
Nonetheless, this type of negative enforcement of the Law of Nations,
or the duty to assist, may not suffice to fulfill the purpose of the WTO’s
Gemeinschaft. Indeed, rich countries may pursue policies that are based on
legitimate, non-trade grounds, which inadvertently have a protectionist effect and are not within the scope of the WTO’s preventative power. A
common example arises out of divergent social or environmental standards
resulting from different levels of development. Although general economic
growth fueled by free trade in poor countries tends to result in increasing
levels of social hygiene under the regulatory Kuznets effect,290 this phenomenon, even if it should transpire, would occur only in the long-term.
However, in the short to medium term, the effect is different under typical
circumstances. Rich countries adopting and enforcing social policies based
on purely legitimate, non-protectionist objectives, such as the protection of
human health or the environment, will find that their poor trading partners
are unable to comply with high, sophisticated regulatory standards. These
countries lack the technical and financial capacity necessary to adopt and
implement such standards. This regulatory non-compliance, albeit innocent
and inescapable from the standpoint of the poor countries, results in the
denial of access to the rich countries’ markets. Clearly, without workable
technical and financial assistance from the rich to the poor, the WTO’s Gemeinschaft would suffer from a serious “development deficit.”291
As this dilemma of divergent standards and capacities demonstrates, the
Law of Nations in international trade should also be manifested through a
positive mode. This requires the rich to play a more active role (beyond
mere anti-protection) in sharing regulatory burdens with the poor without
undue interference with the latter’s market access—a critical developmental
mechanism. A positive role connotes a redistribution of resources, both
technical and financial, between rich and poor countries.292 In 1996, United
States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 293 the
288.
Id. at para. 128.
289.
ATC, supra note 190, pmbl.
290.
See Simon Kuznets, Economic Growth and Income Inequality, 45 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1955);
BJORN LOMBORG, THE SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST: MEASURING THE REAL STATE OF THE WORLD
33 (1998) (observing that people tend to care about high environmental standards only after they become
rich).
291.
Amorim, supra note 21, at 96-99.
292.
See Peter M. Gerhart, Slow Transformations: The WTO as a Distributive Organization, 17 AM.
U. INT’L L. REV. 1045, 1085-93 (2002). But cf. Joel Trachtman, Legal Aspects of a Poverty Agenda at
the WTO: Trade Law and “Global Apartheid,” 6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 3, 5 (2003) (submitting that “global
redistribution” falls under the “domain of politics,” and law “tells us little” about it).
293.
WTO Appellate Body, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
WT/DS2/9 (May 20, 1996) [hereinafter Gasoline], available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu
_e/distab_e.htm.
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very first case adjudicated under the new WTO dispute settlement system,
provided an archetype for development-related litigation of this kind. Brazil
and Venezuela complained that the United States discriminated against foreign refiners in enforcing its domestic environmental standards. The AB
rejected a U.S. defense based on domestic administrative difficulties, holding that the U.S. administration failed to take into account foreign (developing countries in casu) interests and to establish a certain cooperative arrangement with affected countries (Brazil and Venezuela).294 Undoubtedly,
in a setting involving developed and developing countries, a cooperative
arrangement tends to contain both technical and financial assistance. Otherwise, developed countries could not achieve their domestic regulatory
goals on account of the limited regulatory capacity of the developing countries that are affected by those regulations.
Similarly, in 1998, the WTO Appellate Body once again struck down a
U.S. application of its turtle protection legislation in United States—Import
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products.295 The AB found that
the United States failed to make “available and feasible” efforts to negotiate
a cooperative agreement with foreign (developing) countries (India, Pakistan, and Malaysia) affected by the measure, despite the existence of various
multilateral fora for such an agreement.296 Inspiringly, this jurisprudence
has resonated even outside of the WTO, particularly within the context of
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) dispute settlement proceedings. A recent case, In the Matter of Cross-Border Trucking Services,297
arose from the U.S. refusal to allow cross-border transportation of Mexican
trucks for public safety reasons after the United States failed to phase out
the initial moratorium, which was required pursuant to Annex I of the
NAFTA. Faced with a politically sensitive case, the NAFTA panel unanimously ruled that the United States violated NAFTA Articles 1202 (national
treatment for cross-border services) and 1203 (most-favored-nation treatment for cross-border services), since the U.S. government failed to consider “more acceptable, less trade restrictive, alternatives” to a blanket
moratorium.298 The panel also determined that the “inadequacies of the
Mexican regulatory system” could not form the basis for a U.S. moratorium.299 It thereby implied that the U.S., as a developed country, should
have expended more effort to address Mexico’s regulatory inadequacies.
The NAFTA panel cited and relied on the WTO decisions in Gasoline and
Shrimp-Turtle.300
294.
Id. at paras. 26-27.
295.
WTO Appellate Body, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58 (Nov. 6, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle], available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop
_e/dispu_e/distab_e.htm.
296.
Id. at paras. 166-70.
297.
In the Matter of Cross-Border Trucking Services, USA-MEX-98-2008-01, para.1 (Feb. 6, 2001)
[hereinafter NAFTA Trucking], available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/nafta20/truckingservices.pdf.
298.
Id. at para. 268.
299.
Id. at para. 296.
300.
Id. at paras. 265, 267.

File: TheWTO'sGemeinschaft

536

Created on: 5/31/2007 9:32:00 AM

Alabama Law Review

Last Printed: 6/11/2007 10:58:00 AM

[Vol. 56:2:483

Finally, one should note how the Appellate Body has reached this development-related jurisprudence. Obviously, there is no direct textual basis
for this jurisprudence in the relatively few (only 38) provisions of GATT,
which have become obsolete since they have not been updated at all in
GATT’s half-century history. However, the AB managed to develop an
innovative method of interpretation on the basis of the depressingly fixed
text of GATT. The AB focused on the previously unused preambulary language in Article XX, know as the “chapeau.” The AB interpreted the chapeau’s phrases of “arbitrary” or “unjustifiable” discrimination in scrutinizing whether the United States took reasonable measures to take into account
foreign interests. Although the chapeau provides a technical, textual basis
for this new approach, the AB transcended the lexicographical meaning in
articulating an integrative telos for the WTO’s Gemeinschaft.301 In a highly
interdependent world, aggressive regulatory unilateralism by a developed
country—often accompanied by trade sanctions—undoubtedly hurts many
developing countries.302 The only way to attain both regulatory and developmental goals is for developed countries to assist developing countries
attempting to comply with the former’s high regulatory standards by offering proper financial and technical assistance. This is the ideal status in
which a dual goal of free markets and regulatory autonomy can be achieved
in a non-conflicting and harmonious fashion, realizing the aforementioned
telos of communitarian integration.
4. Beyond Formalism: Manifesting Jus Gentium as Soft Law
Once the jus gentium of international trade has fully permeated the
WTO’s Gemeinschaft, the format which caused it to materialize will be
marginalized. When jus gentium becomes more atmospheric, it effectively
conducts communication and discourse by transcending narrow legal formality. Then, a development-related legal reference need not clothe itself in
a hard layer of textual justification. The legal format will be less relevant
once it delivers certain legal meaning and legal force, through which it may
influence and alter the trade and development behavior of its members. This
legal reference is often labeled a “guideline” or “recommendation” and collectively termed “soft law.”303 Admittedly, it is not a formal treaty and thus
is technically non-binding.
301.
Cf. K.N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 31 (1934) (maintaining that “a sane theory would utterly disregard a Documentary text if any relevant practices existed
to offer a firmer, more living basis for the ideal picture.”).
302.
See Cullet, supra note 114, at 558-59 (emphasizing “solidarity,” reflecting the interdependence
and integration of the global trading system).
303.
See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, in
LEGALIZATION, supra note 268, at 37-72; Eibe Riedel, Standards and Sources: Farewell to the Exclusivity of the Sources Triad in International Law?, 2 EUR. J. INT’L L. 58, 79 (1991) (discussing “new economic standards” with the proliferation of international economic transactions). For example, one of the
most representative sectors in the APEC in which such guidelines and standards proliferate is the “standards and conformance” sector. The Sub-Committee on Standards and Conformance (SCSC) was estab-
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However, regardless of its format, such guidelines or recommendations
are typically well observed, chiefly because their creators are mostly working-level regulators (specialists) who regularly participate in sector-specific
committees,304 rather than high-ranking bureaucrats or political appointees
(generalists). In other words, the normative value of soft law can be guaranteed by an epistemic understanding among its creators who engage in the
“jurisgenerative”305 process. Moreover, guidelines or recommendations are
usually clear and unambiguous enough to directly respond to certain situations that involve development concerns. This concreteness contributes to
strong compliance with such micro-legislation or soft law, which can be
referenced, cited, and invoked in real disputes through the vehicle of legal
arguments.
Remarkably, this soft law often provides a constructive solution to potential disputes involving developed and developing countries. As discussed
above,306 the evolution of jurisprudence through the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is capable of addressing development-related disputes.
However, an adjudicative framework unavoidably involves an adversarial
and confrontational dynamic between developed and developing countries.
This dynamic may be undesirable when both parties have high stakes—
where losing the case is politically intolerable to either party. These disputes
are more likely to be intensified and escalated than to be resolved. Under
these circumstances, both developed and developing countries would be
better off if they could resolve their disputes through a rule-making process
rather than an adjudicative procedure possibly involving retaliation as an
enforcement measure. Because it is more transparent and constructive, the
resolution of development-related disputes through the establishment of
new guidelines is far superior to normal settlements which tend to be private
and bilateral. Additionally, a guideline established in this manner can radiate a legal force to third parties in future cases.
A recent WTO case involving Canada and Brazil illuminates and supports the aforesaid position. On February 3, 2001, Canada banned the importation of Brazilian beef for the fear of mad cow disease (BSE).307 Allished under the Committee for Trade and Investment (CTI). One reason for establishing the SCSC was
to encourage the alignment of members’ standards with international standards and to achieve mutual
recognition among APEC economies of conformity assessment in regulated and voluntary sectors. The
SCSC completed the “Guidelines for the preparation, adoption and review of technical regulations” and
the “APEC Food MRA (Mutual Recognition Arrangement): Supplementary Material” in 1997. See
APEC Committee, Standard and Conformances, at http://203.127.220.66/loadall.htm?http://203.127.220
.66/committee/standards.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2004).
304.
See OCED Working Party of the Trade Committee, Regulatory Reform and International Standardization, TD/TC/WP(98)36/FINAL, at 28-32 (Jan. 28, 1999) (discussing “regulators as players in
standardisation”), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/19/1955309.pdf.
305.
See Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE
ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER 110 (Martha Minow et al. eds., 1992).
306.
See supra Part IV.B.3.
307.
Canadian Ban on Brazilian Beef Imports Escalates Trade Battle, BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS
DIG. (Int’l Centre for Trade & Sustainable Dev., Geneva, Switzeland), Feb. 13, 2001, [hereinafter Trade
Battle], available at http://www.newsbulletin.org/getbulletin.cfm?bulletin_ID=14&issue/ID=1937&bro
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though Canada based the ban on a previous measure announced to the
WTO, the measure was originally not meant to apply to Brazil.308 This unexpected, sudden ban by Canada enraged the Brazilian community, prompting the Brazilian government to threaten to challenge Canada in various
international dispute settlement fora, including the International Court of
Justice and the WTO, and to support public protests and boycotts of Canadian products.309 This high-profile dispute could have easily developed into
a full-blown WTO case.310
However, rather than resorting to litigation, the parties elected to address this dispute in the Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
(SPS Committee). During the SPS Committee consultations, Brazil proposed a mandate for EU members to notify the WTO of the introduction of
SPS measures which arise from previously announced SPS policies if those
new SPS measures “may have negative effects on trade opportunities of
developing countries.”311 This proposal was eventually adopted in the SPS
Committee in the form of a revised “Recommended Procedures for Implementing the Transparency Obligations of the SPS Agreement (Article 7).”312
Both Brazil and Canada agreed that the dispute had been resolved with the
adoption of the revised recommendation.313 All told, through a rich discourse steered by the clear legal consciousness of a “development-sensitive”
obligation, a developed country (Canada) and a developing country (Brazil)
succeeded in breathing new life into the existing legal document, and consequently materializing a communitarian symbiosis through the settlement
of this dispute. This was only possible within the legal “force-field” of jus
gentium.

wse=1&SID=.
308.
SPS Committee Resolves Implementation Issue, Discusses Biotech, BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE
NEWS DIG. (Int’l Centre for Trade & Sustainable Dev., Geneva, Switzerland), Mar. 26, 2001, [hereinafter SPS Committee], available at http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/02-03-26/story4.htm.
309.
See Trade Battle, supra note 307.
310.
See, e.g., WTO Panel, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones),
WT/DS26 (Feb. 13, 1998), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/distab_e.htm.
311.
WTO Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Implementation Proposal under
Paragraph 21: Proposal by Brazil, G/SPS/W/108 (June 22, 2001), available at http://docsonline.wto.
org.
Where the introduction of SPS measures may have negative effects on trade opportunities of
developing countries, Members shall provide information in accordance with the provisions
of Annex B and the additional requirements for justification alluded to in Article 10.2, including where the concerned measures constitute an administrative measure, such as a ban or a
temporary suspension of importation, arising from an SPS policy previously notified to the
WTO.
Id.
312.
WTO Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Recommended Procedures for Implementing the Transparency Obligations of the SPS Agreement (Article 7): Revision, G/SPS/7/Rev.2
(Apr. 2, 2002), available at http://docsonline.wto.org.
313.
See SPS Committee, supra note 308.
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C. The Gemeinschaftian Education of Jus Gentium
Law,314 not politics, is the medium of discourse in the WTO’s Gemeinschaft. Participants of the discourse—whether governments, consumers, or
producers—comprehend, evaluate, and predict each other’s trade behaviors
through the law. They also design their own behaviors based on the law.
Therefore, understanding such law (the jus gentium of international trade) is
critical to participation in the Gemeinschaftian discourse within the WTO
system. Without this understanding of the law, the discourse itself is inconceivable. With an inaccurate understanding of the law, the efficiency of the
discourse decreases dramatically. On the contrary, if those participants are
well-versed in the law, the discourse tends to be productive and constructive. It then effectively mediates between what we are and what we ought to
be, and thus achieves the Gemeinschaftian goal—global empathy.
In reality, however, WTO laws, including its statutes and case law, are
too complicated to be understood by ordinary people. WTO jurisprudence is
full of esoteric semantics and codes, which very few would actually venture
to read, let alone comprehend. Typically, only trained legal scholars grapple
with these subjects. Under such circumstances, the discourse in the WTO
tends to be highly exclusive, concentrated in the hands of these elites, or the
titular “groupe sémiotique.”315 Ordinary people remain excluded from the
communicative process because they do not, and cannot, understand WTO
laws if they lack the necessary background knowledge or analytical skills.
This alienating, disintegrative aspect of WTO law can only be overcome by
“educating” ordinary people to comprehend a fundamental, and thus more
understandable, legal precept—the jus gentium of international trade—
rather than those puzzling codes. After all, law, not laws, should be the supreme communicative vehicle for all participants, be they states or individuals. Only then will all participants become proficient in the law, thus improving communication.
In sum, public education on the WTO’s Gemeinschaft, for the sake of
increased public proficiency, should inform the public of the jus gentium of
international trade without seeking mastery of the complicated details of
WTO jurisprudence. For this purpose, an easily comprehensible set of core
precepts about international trade law, tantamount to the “Restatement of
International Trade Law,” should be developed.316 In a sense, this heuristic
document would function as a device to convert esoteric WTO codes to
314.
The term “law” connotes specific treaties, agreements, and other legal documents which are
“reified” forms of law such as the jus gentium of international trade. Yet, these laws cannot contradict
law because the former are reified—directly derived—from the latter. Thomas Aquinas formulated this
structure of understanding law and laws in his notion of “distinguo.” See POUND, supra note 249, at 4.
315.
Cf. BERNARD S. JACKSON, SEMIOTICS AND LEGAL THEORY 286 (1985) (observing that the
“audience,” or “groupe sémiotique” of judicial discourse is relatively restricted); PETER GOODRICH,
LEGAL DISCOURSE: STUDIES IN LINGUISTICS, RHETORIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 7 (1987) (arguing that
“legal practice and legal language are structured in such a way as to prevent the acquisition of such
knowledge by any other than a highly trained elite of specialists in the various domains of legal study”).
316.
A REFORM AGENDA, supra note 221, at 196.
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exoteric law. In addition to this device, an accessible platform where the
public can gain access to this heuristic should also be provided. Such a platform, be it in physical space or cyber space, should be non-commercial and
consultative. Admittedly, it is a challenging mission to launch this platform,
requiring a vast amount of time, money, and energy. Disappointingly, the
WTO as an organization seems to be an implausible candidate for the task
considering its current infrastructure and limited capacity.317
V. CONCLUSION: A PARADIGM SHIFT FROM GESELLSCHAFTIAN COULD
TO GEMEINSCHAFTIAN SHOULD
This Article defines the contemporary global trading system as the
global Gesellschaft and ascribes its development failure to a Gesellschaftian
structure driven by interest, negotiation, and contract, and thus vulnerable to
power disparity and exploitation. The global Gesellschaft is motivated by
the liberal spirit of “right” under which each member could do whatever
may suit its interest. As Steven Brint observes, liberalism has often been
antagonistic to community, that is, the Gemeinschaft, as a normative concept mainly because it views community as having a tendency to limit freedom and creativity with potential authoritarianism.318 Although this liberal
concern is in harmony with the Lockean premise of the social contract, and
is adept at explaining domestic political phenomena, it has its own limitations in the international sphere. Indeed, right-oriented behavioral patterns
risk rationalizing the selfish behavior of powerful members that often disregards other members’ interests. Perhaps, more profoundly, there is simply a
“deep tension” between liberal democracies and cosmopolitan consideration.319 Yet, such inherited and embedded liberal assumptions are prone to
criticism and problematization in this era of unsustainability and development disparity.320
However, if we transform our paradigmatic perspective from right to
duty under the Gemeinschaftian realization, we will take the interests of
others into account when we configure our own. After all, common prosperity and peace is the ultimate goal of the Gemeinschaft. The gestalt of
WTO’s Gemeinschaft is cosmopolitan communitarianism governed by the
Law of Nations, or the jus gentium of international trade, whose core precept is the duty to assist. Under such a premise, the Gesellschaftian understanding of a state’s sovereignty as the unbridled exercise of its physical
power in the international anarchy transforms into the Gemeinschaftian con317.
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struct of the “vindication of the state’s existence as a member of the international system.”321
In fact, the raison d’être of the WTO’s Gemeinschaft stems directly
from the dire implications of the lost agenda of development. The global
Gesellschaft can no longer sustain the current level of widening inequality
and growing poverty,322 which might be depicted as the “global apartheid.”323 The annual sum of agricultural subsidies by the rich countries is
deplorable—“enough to fly their 41 million dairy cows first class around the
world one and a half times”324—while countless farmers in poor countries
suffer from a continued suppression of their produce’s prices due to these
subsidies.325 Critically, poverty is not merely an economic policy issue, but
“a matter of life and death”326 to many people around the globe.327 A system
failing to address such unsustainable economic inequality and injustice cannot resist being criticised as illegitimate and unfair.328 This global economic
injustice resulting from the failed global Gesellschaft will become more
painful and severe, and thus less tolerable, as the Gesellschaft becomes
more integrated and interdependent.329 Thus, underdevelopment and marginalization in one corner of the globe could cause asymmetrical shocks or
direct physical threats to another.330 Ultimately, the failure to deliver true
development assistance is not confined to economic ramifications: It threatens peace. In the face of such exigency, the WTO Gesellschaft has not been,
and should not be, an answer. Only global empathy realized through the
achievement and operation of the WTO Gemeinschaft based on the Law of
Nations can deliver true changes.
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After all, we are all “involved in Mankind.”331
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